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1\IEASVRE!VIENT OF GOVERNE!\IEI\'T INTERVE~TIO:"i: 
A COl\IPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS 
lntr·oduction 
The variation in protection awarded to agricultural commodities indicates some 
general patterns of protection across industrialized and developing countries. The 
observed patterns exhibit a positive relationship of the level of protection with the per 
capita incomes and negative relationship with the number of farmers and the share of 
agriculture in the national economy (Bureau and Kalaitzandonakes. I 995. Gautam. I C)CJ:') 
~ ' 
A predominant pattern of agncultural protectionism across countnes Is that, while fanners 
in industrialized countries receive subsidies through income enhancing and price support 
programs, their counterparts in developing countries are generally taxed (CSDA. I 99:1, 
OECD. 1992) The producer support programs in industrialized countries invariably result 
111 higher food prices for consumers while developing countries adopt cheap food policies 
to improve accessibility to food for poor urban consumers (Schultz, 1978; Millec 1986. 
Byerlee and Sain, 1986) 
This paper analyzes the different protection measurement concepts and their 
effectiveness in measuring the level of protection. An accurate measurement of the actual 
level of intervention is a prerequisite for effective analysis Therefore. a comprehensive 
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comparative analysis of various measurement concepts and their policy coverage is 
provided The choice of a measurement concept is also highlighted, along with its merits 
and limitations The analysis is followed by a display ofthe comparative results with a 
graphic exposition of the food commodity market distortions in the cases of small and 
large countries The case of price discrimination, where foreign markets are competitive 
and the domestic market is monopolized, is also discussed 
Comparative Analysis of Protection Measurement Concepts 
Government intervention in agriculture affects market prices and producer 
incentives through a myriad of distortionary policies. The policy transfers to agricultural 
producers may be occasioned by price and nonprice supports While some policv 
mstruments may atTect these variables directly with relatively transparent effects that are 
easily calculable, some other policies designed to affect the agricultural sector as a whole 
or the entire economy may also have substantial influence on market conditions for 
mdividual commodities The product-specific effects of such indirect policies may not, at 
times, be easily discerned One ofthe underlying elements ofthe policy analysis, 
therefore, is to determine the magnitude of the influence of such divergent policy 
instruments on market incentives (Josling and Tangermann, 1989) 
The number of different policies as well as the ambiguity of the effects of certain 
policies reqwres that the measurement concept used to gauge the actual level of 
intervention must be capable of identifYing the product-specific and aggregate effects of a 
wide range of diverse policies. The recent focus in international trade policy forums, such 
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as GATT. on using estimates of the extent of protection has espoused a variety of 
measurement concepts, each with its ov ..:n specific coverage of given policies The studies 
on the extent of government intervention and the trade distortion impacts of market price 
support and other policies have emphasized the measurement ofthe gaps generated 
between the domestic and border prices The various concepts developed to determine 
market distortions are related to one another by modifications, extensions or derivatives of 
the measurements ofthis gap (Cahill and Legg, 1990) 
We first provide a comprehensive analysis of these measures of estimation and 
their policy coverage. Various measures of protection are defined in the next subsection 
along with a comparative analysis of the policy effects captured by these measures 
Alternative /'vfeasurement Concepts(~{ Agricultural Protection 
Studies of agricultural protection have employed alternative measurement concepts 
which differ in their 11eanings and in terms of their uses and degree of complexity One or 
the most common concepts to measure the extent of government intervention is to 
determine the price wedge, the difference between domestic and border prices, for a 
specific commodity, as used by Bela Balassa ( 1965). The simplest and most widely used 
measurement of the price wedge is the nominal rate of protection ( NRP) and the nominal 
protection coefficient (NPC) (for example, Tyers and Anderson, 1992; de Gorter and 
Tsur. 1 991, Krueger. Schiff and Valdes, 1991; Miller, 1991; Balisacan and Roumasset, 
1987: Anderson and Hayami, 1986; Honma and Hayami, 1986; and Bigman, 1985). 
However, \vhere the effects of government policies are not directly translated into 
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domestic prices, these measures would provide only a partial indication of the extent of 
government intervention. While some concepts are restricted to the measurement of the 
price wedge alone. some other aggregate measures have also included the effects of a 
\Vide range of other interventionary policies Some other measures have, therefore, been 
developed over time that try to capture the di:;tortionary eiTects of a number of policies 
Table 1 lists the mathematical formulas for 14 different measures of the levels of 
agricultural producer and consumer protection. The N!'C is defined as the ratio of 
domestic to border prices, expressed in a common currency The NRJ' estimates the price 
\vedge, measured in the domestic currency, in percentage terms. These estimates mdicate 
the responsiveness of domestic prices to government policies The consumer counterpart 
of NRJ' the nominal rate of protection for consumers (NHPC), similarly measures the 
wedge bet\veen domestic consumer price and the border price of a given commoditv The 
novelty of these measures is the relative ease with which these estimates can be calculated 
if reliable statistics on domestic and border prices are available. However, these measures 
fail to take into account the effects of any policies that do not affect producer prices 
(Schwartz and Parker, 1988). 
An extension of the NRP concept is provided by the nominal rate of assistance 
(NRA ), which takes into account the aggregate returns to producers -the output produced 
times the domestic price plus other subsidies or taxes- and expresses it as a percentage of 
\Vorld prices (Cahill and Legg, 1990) Subsidies like deficiency payments that are not 
captured by NPC or NRP are included in the NRA estimates. The higher the level of such 
pavments, the greater would be the difference between the estimate provided by NRP and 
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,'v'HA :\ionetheless, the NRA and NRP measures do not capture the effects of distortions in 
the input markets 
Since input pricing policies effectively distort producer incentives, it is imperative 
to account for policies that affect both input and output markets The effective rate of 
protection (F-RJ)) provides a better measure ofthe level of protection since it considers the 
JOint ctTects of input and output policies on the value added (Carden, 1971 and 19117, 
Jusling and Tangermann, 1989) The FRP is calculated as the percentage ditTerence in the 
unit value added at domestic and border prices, expressed in a common currency Thus, 
UU' vvould capture the effects of a subsidy on an intermediate input that might distort the 
supply and prices of the final commodity In the case of agricultural outputs that use the 
outputs of other sectors as an intermediary input such as grain-fed livestock the estimate.~ 
of overall distortion provided by the LRP measure vvould be supenor to those JXOvlded h\ 
the /'v'RP or NFcA The J:IcP_ therefore, may better indicate resource misallocation among 
various sectors of an economy (Carden, 1971) 
A number of policies, such as investment subsidy for agriculture, that do not atTect 
the value added are not incorporated in l:RP calculations. Thus, EIU) may not provide a 
complete picture of all policy-induced output distortions (Cahill and Legg, 1990) 
\1oreover, information requirements for calculating ERP are quite stringent since LRP 
calculations involve estimating NJ(]J for the final commodity, NPRCs for all intermediate 
inputs, and technical information on input-output coefficients, which are relatively difficult 
to obtain (Schwartz and Parker, 1988) 
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The effective rate of assistance, ERA. like the NRA. extends the ERP concept to 
include all other assistance to output and inputs, represented by iS in Table 1 The 
difference between the value added at border and domestic prices, then, is expressed as a 
percentage wedge, measuring the assistance to the production activitv rather than to the 
product itself The consideration of policy effects on the overall activity in the given 
commodity provides a clearer indication ofthe extent to which it would attract resources 
from other sectors. Since policies such as investment subsidy for agriculture do not affect 
the value added, these are not reflected in the calculations of ERP or ~R4 I 
Some other variants of NRP. the nominal rates of protection due to direct and 
indirect policies (NPRn and NFR,). were recently proposed in a comprehensive \Vorld Bank 
mvestigation by Kmeger, Schiff and Valdes ( 1 991) These measures recognize the 
essential differences between the policies that affect agricultural prices (of both inputs and 
outputs) directly and those more general macroeconomic policies that affect producer 
returns indirectly but in a significant way (Krueger, 1989) 2 The NPRo adjusts the 
domestic and border prices for differences in transportation and storage costs and other 
quality differentials while the Nl'R1 also considers the effects of economy-wide policies, 
such as exchange rate distortions and protection awarded to the nonagricultural sector. on 
the agricultural producer incentives The total nominal protection rate includes both the 
direct and indirect components discussed earlier. The NPRr thus considers agricultural 
protection in a general equilibrium framework Since the general equilibrium effects may 
be rather significant in countries where agriculture constitutes a high proportion of the 
labor force and gross domestic product, NPR.r may be a useful measure. However, 
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excluding the income support policies limits the usefulness of these measures. especially 
for industrialized countries 
An alternative producer protection measurement concept the producer subsidv 
equivalents (PSEs), was first used in Australia in the mid-l960s The FSJ~·s. and their 
consumer counterpart, the consumer subsidy equivalents (CSEs), were later formally 
advanced by Tim Josling of the Food and Agricultural Organization (F AO) of the linited 
\lations, m the early 1970s (FAO. 1973 and 1975) The J'Sl'-- concept has been further 
refined. extended and used in various forms and several versions of these measures exist 
For example, the F AO. the OECD, the USDA and IIASA (International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis) have developed their own estimates of P,\'Es and CSFs for selected 
countries (Gardner, 1991) The OECD uses these measures to monitor the level of 
government mtervention in member countries while the USDA calculates the!'\!: and C 'Sf 
estimates for a number of industrialized and developing countries The usefulness of /'.W 
and C'.\'1:· estimates is in their ability to summarize the effects of multiple policy interactions 
into a single monetary estimate that can be readily used to compare protection levels 
across commodities and countries (Bray et al, 1992) The flexibility ofthese measures to 
include or exclude any number of policies makes them useful because they can be tailored 
to meet the different objectives of any specific investigation 
A PSI~ is defined as the level of subsidy that would be necessary to compensate 
agricultural producers if all farm policies were removed. Similarly, a CSE is defined as the 
amount of compensation to be given to consumers to keep their incomes unchanged after 
removing all agricultural programs. Unlike the measures discussed earlier, the PSE and 
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CSJ," concepts focus on income transfers to producers and consumers from government 
programs. The estimation of P.SFs includes the effects of a number of diverse agricultural 
policies that directly and indirectly affect producer incentives. As is evident from Table 2, 
the policy coverage under fJ,','Ls extends to direct payments to farmers, input market 
distortions, marketing assistance and economy-wide policies. The government outlays to 
assist agricultural production in the longrun. such as expenditures on research and 
extension, land improvement, conserntion programs, development of irrigation facilities. 
etc, are also a part of the PSF calculations. The USDA estimates of PSEs also incorporate 
the indirect effects of exchange rate distortions, so prevalent in developing countries The 
PSFs account for nonborder policy measures that are not included in the :VRP and FRP 
calculations 
Thus, the policy coverage of NRA is wider than that of NPC and /v'JV' but shorter 
than lcRP and ERA (not shown in Table 2) which, in turn, include the effects of a lesser 
number of policies than are covered by the PS!~s. In short, the calculations of NRJ' and 
F:.RP measures require similar amounts of information as do PSEs, whereas the estimates 
provided by NRP and D?.P measures are neither as complete nor as flexible as those 
provided by the PSEs (Tangermann et al, 1987).3 
Among these measures, NPC, NRP, NRA. NPRC, NPRn. NPRr. ERP and £RA aptly 
capture the effects ofborder measures (such as tariffs, quotas, variables levies and export 
subsidies). domestic price support policies and distortions created by the national 
marketing board activities and state trading operations as well as the effects of other 
policies that distort domestic producer and consumer prices (Table 2) The NRA includes 
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the effects of more policies (such as deficiency payments and producer levies) than the 
,VRJ' and NPC measures But the NRA falls short of the A'PR1 concept in its policv 
coverage that also includes effects of economy-wide policies. Hovvever, these measures 
would underestimate the overall protection levels where policies such as direct payments, 
input assistance (besides l·JU' and ERA), marketing and infrastructure assistance, which do 
not affect the domestic prices directly, are an integral pa11 ofthe national protectionistic 
policies 
Figure 1 provides policy-wise producer protection expenditures captured by 
alternative measures of support for the United States for wheat sector for the period 1979 
to 1994 The figure also illustrates the comparison ofthe extent ofthe policy coverage for 
NRP. UU' and PSI:'. \Vhile all three measures account for the market pnce support 
component of the overall policy intervention, the ;V/U) excludes input subsidies, direct 
payments, general services. subnational policy programs, plus other miscellaneous policies 
The FJcP, on the other hand, includes input subsidies but fails to account for the effects of 
the rest of the policies4 The !'Sl~· concept, therefore, is more comprehensive in its policy 
coverage as compared to the alternative measures of protection The estimates provided 
bv consumer subsidy equivalents are superior to those provided by the NPRC measure 
since CS!:' calculations also incorporate direct and indirect consumer assistance policies 5 
Hmvever. the protection measures discussed thus far ignore the effects of supply-control 
policies This variant of PSEs concentrates only on the producer income transfers to 
gauge the extent of government intervention and ignores the trade distortionary output 
effects ofthe policies. 
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The relatively recent contributions in the measurement of producer protection 
levels have been the introduction of aggregate measures of support being considered in the 
GATT (A/v!S(;) to account for the trade distortional)' effects of agricultural policies '' The 
ongoing GATT negotiations have favored another variant of PSF the A/viS,; concept, in 
order to define a base level of protection for each country on which to define the future 
protection reduction targets The Alvf.\'(; expresses the price wedge as the difference 
bet\veen the domestic "policy" price of a commodity for 1986 and the average world 
reference price of that commodity for 1986-88. The Alvf.Sc; concept mainly focuses on the 
<;upply-control policies by evaluating the level of distortion by maintaining the current 
output levels in the absence of current farm support programs 
We now elaborate trade distortionarv effects of domestic policies \Ve provide a 
comparative analysis of two van ants of F.\'I~·s, one that accounts for income transfers tc1 
domestic producers, thus gauging the extent of government intervention, and another that 
measures the trade distortionary effects of agricultural policies We also highlight the 
choice of PSlc as the dependent variable for the empirical part of this study. 
Choice of a measurement concept 
The discussion in the previous section highlights the distinction in the meaning and 
policv coverage of various measurement concepts used in the studies aimed at determining 
the extent of government intervention or the trade distortionary impacts of intervention 
The analysis suggests that the producer subsidy equivalents, with the widest coverage of 
agricultural policies, are the most comprehensive and flexible means of gauging the effects 
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of government intervention in agricultural markets Nonetheless, the choice of a 
measurement concept is directly contingent upon the desired objectives of any empirical 
work For instance, if the aim of a particular study is only to gauge the extent of price 
distortion, the NRP or NPC may not only provide the intended comparison but are also 
relatively easy to calculate However, to ascertain the actual level of government 
intervention, the P5J'i'.o·s may be the most suited measurement concept 
f'c)'f~s have been quoted as having the attraction of pragmatism (MacLaren, I 991) 
vvhile Cahill and Legg ( 1990) singled out P5Es on the basis of their practicality over a 
number of other measurements The flexibility of the PSL approach is manifest in its 
ability to include or exclude any 'desirable' policies, in its potential to handle 
supply-control policies (through a modified version), and in its additivitv prope11v that 
allows aggregation across commodities to arrive upon a comprehensi\·e protection index 
for the overall agricultural sector (Tangermann et al , 1987) The data needs for 
calculating fJSEs are also manageable (Josling and Tangermann, 1989). The P.SEs have 
been widely used by organizations such as OECD and USDA and this approach has also 
found favor with GATT's Uruguay Round negotiations since it summarizes the effects of 
a number of agricultural policies into a single monetary or percentage unit that can be 
readilv used to make comparisons across commodities and countries (Bray et a!, 1992) 7 
Gardner ( 1990a) cites various problems in using NPCs and NRPs as a 
measurement of protection levels. First, since the overvaluation of currencies is common 
in developing countries, the conversion of domestic and world prices into a common 
currency tends to underestimate the actual level oftaxation Second, since input subsidies 
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arc also common in some developing countries, the actual level oftaxation would be 
lov,er than the NPC' and lY'Rf' estimates Third, in the case of a large count!"\, the internal 
prices of a commodity may also influence \Vorld prices 8 Finally, the measurements of 
world price are not based upon the price that \vould have existed in the international 
market in the absence of farm policies However, all of the alternative measures arc 
equally vulnerable to the choice ofworld price (Tangermann eta! 1987) 
The main assumptions underlying the calculations of J'SJ: and ('Sf: concepts include 
partial-equilibrium framework; homogeneous goods with no substitution possible in 
production or consumption; prices of nontraded goods and other sectors held constanc 
domestic and foreign goods considered to be perfect substitutes; and a small country case 
These concepts do not account for social costs and benefits j\;evertheless_ as MacLaren 
( 1991) points out "one of the practical reasons why the methodology [of PSF and (Sf: 1 
has been used in the Uruguay Round is that it is a partial-equilibrium approach that can be 
used on a commodity-by-commodity and country-by-country basis on price, quantity and 
trade data which are readily available " He further contends that "while these assumptions 
are not satisfactory from a theoretical point of view, they do allow consistently calculated 
values of transfers to be placed before negotiators .. , 
Regarding the partial equilibrium framework employed in the PSE concept, it is 
noted in Josling and Tangermann (! 989) that "general-equilibrium-adjusted rate of 
protection in agriculture is probably only marginally different from the rate of protection 
measured in the traditional partial approach" (p 345). They further opine that the rate of 
protection that is based on a general equilibrium framework tends to be less than that 
13 
estimated using the pa11ial equilibrium approal h. One other assurnption in the calculation 
of J'SE is the notion that a dollar in government expenditures results in a dollar increase in 
producers- income. 
In short, the benefits of using subsidy equivalents for measuring protection levels 
include being simple and flexible; a wider policy coverage; and enabling cross-countrv and 
cross-commodity comparisons on individual and aggregate basis -the additivity property 
(Ballenger, 1988) Overall, the extent of distortions captured by P.\,'/~s and CSJ~'s can be 
up to 30 percent more than captured by other alternative measures (Schwartz and Parker_ 
p 1143) However, all of these measures of protection suffer from two problems 
ignoring general equilibrium effects and being based on a small countrv assumption 
The basic det1nition of PSFs, vvith its emphasis on income transfers to agncultural 
producers, is more suitable for gauging the extent of government intervention This 
measure aptly suits the purpose of an investigation where the focus is on analyzing the 
mcome redistribution effects and determinants of government intervention in agriculture 
across countries However, \vhere the focus is on measuring trade distortions and effects 
of liberalization by looking into how much the output of a sector is influenced by a policy 
this measure seems to be less satisfactory (Hathaway, 1987) For example, a country can 
wvitch to a policy that further distorts producer incentives without changing the actual 
transfers to producers. As originally proposed, the PSi': approach was designed to capture 
income transfer effects and not the distortions to production caused by domestic farm 
policies This inability has resulted in the development of a variant of the PSI:', the 'trade 
distortion producer subsidy equivalent' (PSEm), that focuses primarily on the output 
14 
distor1ing effects of policies The advocates of PSEs in multilateral trade negotiations 
have favored using the p,)'/:·n . which would capture the effects of a policv switch that 
distorts output. The original version of the PSE in this case would stay the same smcc 
income transfers remain unchanged These two variants of PSXs. as \vel! as iVRJ' measure. 
are compared belmv under a small country case (i) where the producer incentives are 
influenced through indirect government outlays. and (ii) where producer incentives are 
influenced \Vithout involving budgetary expenditures 
Consider the case of a closed small country where supply of the commodity in 
question is represented by the curve ,)"and the domestic demand by D. as shown rn 
Figure 2. panel A Suppose that the domestic price is maintained at Pc~. to support the 
domestic farmers. which is above the vvorld price F., The output produced is 0() If the 
government supports the agricultural sector by subsidizing research and extensron 
activities, this would shift the supply curve in the long run to S , with the new output level 
OQ: The gross total value ofthe NRP measure, in this case, is OPJhQ2 - OP"aQ1 ~ 1\P,l 
ha The similar estimate ofPSE is OP11 hQ:- OP"aQ2 plus the indirect government 
expenditures on research and extension, given by the area PJ)Pch. In order to compare 
these estimates with the absolute trade distortion effects captured by the PSEm. the policy 
mcentive price needs to be identified that would elicit the same amount of output ( OQc) in 
the absence of the indirect subsidy. The incentive price that would support OQ2 level of 
output at the old supply curve would be PP. The trade distortionary effects captured by 
this measure extend the price wedge to OPPcQ2- OP"aQ2 = P YPca. 
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In this case, it is apparent that the NRP and PSE capture the same extent of the 
market price support but the PSE also incorporates the government outlay on research and 
extension in its calculations Therefore, the distortionary effects captured by the l'SF are 
higher than those captured by the NRP measure The overall estimates of the distortion 
provided by the trade-distortion and the government-intervention variants of PSL' are 
similar in this case although the market price support measured by the PSL·,,) is relativelv 
h1gher than the PSI~· by the area PJ)Pcb, which is also the amount of government 
expenditures 
However, in the case where the policies that influence output but do not involve 
government expenditures, the similarity ofthe estimates provided by the two PSI:' 
measures would cease to exist In other \vords, the policies that result in a shift of the 
supply curve but do not enter the regular calculations of PSF_ the estimates of the 
distortion provided by the two PSI._: measures would no longer be identical For example. 
Bray et a! ( 1992) show that in case of supply restraint programs like the flex acres in the 
United States, the resulting estimates ofthe trade distortion and government intervention 
P5~Fs would be different 9 
Cons1der initially that the world price, F., is allowed to prevail in the domestic 
market and the total output produced is OQ1 Further, consider a case where the 
government policies result in a disincentive for producers that shifts the supply curve back 
from S to S (Figure 2, panel B). The shift due to the disincentive policy reduces the 
domestic output to OQ2 at the world price. In this case, the policy incentive price that 
would restnct the output to OQ2 without the policy, will be Pp. Here, the NRP and P.\'E 
16 
measures would shmv zero distortions since the price wedge is nonexistent and there are 
no government outlays. The PSEm. however, would capture the negative trade 
distortionary effects ofthis policy on the producers and would be equal to the area 
()fJPcQ2 - Ol\,hQ2 =- P /\he 
In contrast, now consider the case where the government mamtains the domestic 
pnce at higher than the world price level at P J, resulting in the domestic output OQ_, along 
the supply curveS (Figure 2, panel B). The shift in the supply curve to S due to this 
policy would, in this case, decrease the domestic output to OQ1 Here, the effects ofthis 
policv would provide different estimates of the three measures of support The numerator 
of VJV' as well as PSI~- estimates would be P ~P J.ia, which represents the market price 
support or the \vedge between the domestic and the border price The policy incentive 
price that would maintain the output at OQ1 without the policy would be the same as the 
world price P ~ The trade distortion measuring definition of PSF -the P,)'J•.:n:,- would in 
this case be zero. The effects of a decoupled payment, a payment that is unrelated to the 
output, would also be similar. 
These examples appropriately illustrate the differences in the policy coverage 
between NRI' and the two variants of producer subsidy equivalents The P,)E focuses on 
the income transfers to the producers while the PSEm captures how the output of the 
commodity is influenced by the distortionary policy, highlighting the trade distortionary 
effects of the policies. Therefore, the discussion suggests that for studies aimed at 
measuring the extent of government involvement in a given sector and its effect on 
producers' income, the appropriate measure would be the PSE On the other hand, in the 
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case where the interest is to analyze the effects of policies on the trade distortions in the 
commodity markets, as was the case in GATT negotiations, the f'S'l~-~· would provide more 
consistent estimates. 
In international trade forums, the main focus is on how the government policies 
distort the incentives for domestic production and on the adverse efTects of the distcll1cd 
supply on the trading pa11ners of a country. In such negotiations, the extent of 
government outlays and the transfers to the domestic producers seem to be much less of a 
concern In case where negotiations are based upon the estimations ofthe distortion 
provided by the producer subsidy equivalent measures, the trade distortionar,· version of 
this measure would provide more meaningful information The use of PSI::n has recently 
received considerable support in trade negotiations (Brav. et al 1992. i'vleilkc and \Varlc) 
!989. Rossmiller and Elliott, 1989; Tangermann, 1989, Tangermann. et aL 1987) The 
measures proposed earlier bv the Canadian government (trade distortion equivalent Tf >F) 
and theE U (the support measurement unit, SMU) also represent the constant output 
version of the producer subsidy equivalents (F APR!, 1992; Colman, 1991; IA TRC 1990) 
The emphasis of aggregate measure of support (Al\1S) is on finding a commonly 
agreeable definition of the measurement concept and, later, on gradual reduction in the 
support levels as measured by this concept The A/vL')' is calculated on a product-specific 
basis for each product that receives the market price support and other specified assistance 
\Vhile the nonproduct-specific support is combined into a single composite monetary 
estimate The AlvfS calculates the market price incentives by using the wedge between the 
hvpothetical policy price (or the applied administered price) for the commodity for 1986 
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and the average ofthe fixed external reference price for 1986-88 The wedge is multiplied 
by the quantity of output eligible to receive the policv price in that period to obtain the 
resulting base for future negotiations on trade liberalization and reductions in government 
support Since the focus here is on trade distortion and not on domestic expenditures for 
farm programs, unlike PSI:'. the budgetary outlays made to maintain this gap. such as 
buying or storage costs, are not considered in the AlvfS calculations 
Table 3 highlights the policies covered under the t\vo data sets uSDA ( 1990) and 
OECD ( 1991) Although there are some differences between the estimates calculated by 
these two organizations, they are broadly comparable (Blandford, 1990) The following 
discussion highlights the compatibility of using these two data sets in the empirical analvsrs 
in this studv since both account for similar policies and provide similar estimates of the 
extent of government intervention 
Generally, the USDA and OECD calculations of support to domestic producers can 
be summarized into six similar broad categories market price support, direct income 
enhancing policies, programs assisting variable costs of production, marketing assistance 
services, programs affecting long-term agricultural production and controlled exchange 
rate distor1ions (Table 2) Market price support policies include border measures and 
price stabilization schemes designed to raise (or lower, in case of some developing 
countries) domestic producer prices. Since the higher prices are untenable to be sustained 
in an open economy, the border measures also follow restriction on competition in 
domestic markets by applying trade restrictions. The direct payments to producers, or 
producer levies which have negative effects on production, are also included in the P.)'F:-
19 
calculations, as mentioned earlier Input and marketing assistance policies, such as 
transportation subsidies, also lower producer costs although their effect on producer 
revenues are ambiguous. These policies are included as indirect protection policies in both 
USDA and OECD calculations 
Long-term production assistance policies included in the calculations cause fewer 
trade distortions in the shor1run than do market price support policies However, certain 
long-term and other policies may fall under different categories in these data sets clue to 
their effect on current output For example, the electricity subsidy to Indian farmers is 
counted in the USDA calculations as an input subsidy rather than under the infrastructure 
support. as mentioned in the government outlays 
The l'SDA calculations, in addition to the OECD classification, also include the 
effects of exchange rate distortions in case of developing countries but account fc1r the 
effects of subnational policies only for the United States and Canada :--.Jone of these 
calculations include the cross-commodity effects of protection awarded to an agricultural 
commodity Nor are the effects on producer incentives of subsidies to the agribusiness 
sector (the tood processing industries, for example) included in these estimates. The 
administrative costs as well as the social security benefits and general economywide 
taxation policies are also excluded The reduction in incomes due to policies that control 
supplies such as uncompensated acreage reduction programs in the United States (as 
discussed in the case illustrated earlier) and the dairy production quotas in E. C and 
Canada, are also not included in these estimates The overall product-specific as well as 
aggregate estimates of producer and consumer protection levels provided by these 
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organizations are similar to a great extent (Figure 3) Therefore, the estimates from these 
sources can be merged to enhance the coverage of countries and commodities in the 
present study The USDA data are shown only for 1982-87 
There have been relatively few quantitative studies on the determination of 
government intervention in agriculture in a product-specific framework The majority of 
these studies have adopted an aggregative approach to analyzing agricultural protection 
Since most protectionistic policies are based upon individual commodities and vary 
significantly across commodities, aggregating the effects of policies designed to influence 
different commodities individually would obscure the significance of the results For 
example, the Indian government provides subsidies to oilseeds while it taxes the cereal 
producers 
Table 4 shows the protection awarded to specific commodities as \Veil as the effect 
of aggregating the protection level for all these commodities. The table shows that while 
individual commodities may be rather heavily taxed or subsidized, the aggregate 
agricultural protection levels, as are used in most earlier studies, reflect only mild 
interventions in such cases. For example, the aggregate P5'!Cs for 1984 show zero level of 
government support while there was substantial taxation (corn, cotton-long, sorghum, 
soybean and wheat) or subsidization (cotton- medium, peanuts, rapeseed and rice) of 
individual commodities in that year Therefore, the aggregate estimates may lead one to 
believe falsely that the government intervention is rather less pervasive in some cases while 
the opposite might be the case. The aggregation across commodities thus obscures these 
differences (Herrmann, 1989) This certainly poses a problem in cases where governments 
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subsidize certain commodities, while they tax others Such policies are widespread m 
developing economies for reasons such as food security tor poor consumers or national 
concerns_ among others Results of studies that include developing countries in their 
analvsis of cross-country agricultural protection using the aggregate protection levels mav 
be adversely influenced by this problem Therefore, the present analysis would adopt a 
pmduct-\peC!fic approach to study the extent of government intervention in the 
agricultural sector. A graphical comparison of the ability of selected measures to capture 
the market distortions is presented for different policy scenarios in a trade theoretic 
framework 
Comparative Graphic Analysis of Measurement Concepts 
\Ve now provide a comparative analysis of selected measurement concepts withm <J 
theoretical f]-amework The analysis compares the Marshallian producer surplus measure 
with l'v'RP and PSE estimates fcx small and large country cases under a variety of policy 
scenanos The commodity in question is assumed to be a staple food commodity (normal 
good). 
1Heasuring 1Harket Distortions in Case r~f a Small Country 
Cons1der a small country with supply and demand of a staple agricultural 
commodity shown by Sand D, respectively (Figure 4) The assumption here is that the 
country's share of the world market for that commodity is too small to influence the world 
market prices ln addition, this particular commodity constitutes an insignificant part of 
the domestic economy to have any effects on the foreign exchange rate. In the absence of 
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anv distOJiionary policy, the world price, P". prevails in the domestic market At this 
price, domestic production is OQ;' domestic consumption is ocl and the QC: quantity IS 
imported Here the gross returns to the producers are OQJJP", which, after taking into 
account the variable production costs. result in the producer surplus equivalent to the area 
Now suppose that the government decides to increase the producers' income by 
providing them a direct subsidy per unit of production such that the market price still stays 
at P, 1" Farmers are promised the difference PP-P". as deficiency payments per unit The 
domestic production increases to OQ_, and, since consumption remains at the same level, 
impOiis drop to Q:CI Farmers' gross income now is OP1dQ2 and the producer surplus is 
uP1d This involves the cost to the government equal to the area }Jj\d;. which clearly is 
higher than the gains to the domestic producers by the area hd; 
In order to determine the extent of market distortions captured by the NRP and 
f'SJ,· measures of protection, the estimates provided by these measures can be compared 
with the change in producer surplus. To facilitate such comparisons, the change in 
producer surplus may be converted into the percentage change (%~PS) at (i) border 
value, using the base of the nominal protection rate; and (ii) market value, using the base 
of producer subsidy equivalent 
lvPR 0·1' d - 0·1\,. Q·Pw 
%6PS 1 I BorderPr 1ces 
0PwiQ2 - OP..,;Q2 
0Pv.}Q2 
PwPpdh 
OP.")Q2 
0, 
The SRI' measure is not capable of capturing the market distortions that do not affect 
domestic prices Here, while producers evidently gain due to this direct transfer. the /v'Rf' 
fails to capture this gain Therefore, in this case, NRP underestimates the actual market 
distortions 
On the other hand, l'SE does consider the transfers to producers such as dcficiencv 
pavmcnts as 
whereas, 
CJ.l'd- Q.f'~ +( J)+f )0 
Q·l\1 +D·Q 
CJI'.,fCh- Ol'wiQ~ + l'~l'pdi 
OP,.:JQ: + 1'-.,l'pdi 
%6PS' = 
· 1.-\larket Pr 1ces 
f'wf'pdh 
Ol'pdQ: 
l'...)'pd! 
()J'pd!): 
Clearly !'SF overestimates the gains to producers by the area hdj which repre~ents extra 
cost assoc1ated with producing quantity Q Q~ domestically rather than importing It This 
brings forth the weakness associated with the calculating the extent of distortion using the 
1'-'>'lc. The PSF measures the effects of some government programs by the level of 
government expenditure, which may bear little relationship to its effect on market 
distortion (Schwartz and Parker, 1988) Comparing these three measures, it is evident 
that 
PSF %iJPS Bnrdcr Pnccs > %iJPS .\farkel f'nccs > NRP. 
0Jow, suppose that the government provides a price subsidy that raises the 
producer price to P r rather than providing a direct income transfer to the farmers as in the 
prev1ous case Here, the estimates of NRP and comparative producer surplus would be 
NPR OPpdQ~- OP,.jQ~ OP-.jQ2 
PwPpd) 
OP-.jQ2 
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%J6PSI 
' r Hnrder l'r ic'C 
1\,!'pd/J 
()[' ><)!) ~ 
/v'RJJ overestimates the percent change in producer surplus at border price by the area hc/1 
The P.\L measure also overestimates the percentage change in producer surplus at market 
prices but underestimates the same at border prices 
0/'pdQ-:.- O!'"J!J: 
Ol'pdQ: 
01< 6P)' O ._ 1.\farkerl'r Jc'C 
Therefore. 
!'"Ppd/J 
()f'pd(h 
[' .1' pdl 
O!'rd!J" 
N RP %iJPS: Border F'nces > PSJ:' %iJP S Markel l'n es 
Clearly, for price induced producer subsidy, NJUJ overestimates the distortion by a larger 
amount as compared to the P,)'h_·_ which is contrary' to the assertions made in Schwartz and 
Parker ( 1988) that "For . the price induced producer subsidy. the J'SJ~· is identical to the 
NN.l'-- 11 
!\ow consider a case where the government institutes a tariff on the imports of the 
commodity that raises the domestic price to PP from P W· The government uses all of the 
tariff revenue, oenk to further assist the domestic producers by providing a price subsidy 
of F,P! These trade distortions cause changes in real economic variables. Consumption 
now is OC· down from OC1, domestic production is OQ3, and imports drop to Ql ':, 
representing restrictions on market access The policy also results in price-induced 
income effects Consumer surplus decreases by the area P J)Pec whereas producer surplus 
nov, is equal to aPJ This revenue-neutral tariff plus the producer subsidy policy results 
in net economic loss to the domestic economy equal to the triangles bfk (which represents 
the additional cost associated with producing quantity Q1Q3 domestically rather than 
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1mporting it) and nee (since consumers buy CC less in quantity and pay higher per unit 
price for it) 
In this case, the comparison among the NRP. PSI~- and percentage changes in 
producer surplus at border and market prices yields 
''1)1) J'.,I'Jk o; !\PSI l'v.I':f" 1)('1. 
JV \ = !)-[' '-('' > lOLl. Ji 1 = ()J-' 1-() > ,) j = H·K ~ ::, on er pnce v. K ::,__ 3 P"P1fk o/ t1PS'I _ r'.J':fh OJ'r(Q1 > ·· O· L \l.orkcipwe - ()f'JI!o 
It may be stated, therefore, that the market distortion captured by the NRP and !'SF 
measures would provide identical estimates of the level of distortion both in the case of a 
price subsidy or import tariffs Nonetheless. it should be noted that the absolute 
differences in the two estimates would be contingent upon the size ofthe direct payments 
since the direct payments enter both the numerator and the denominator of the 1'.\/: 
Since these distortions also affect the domestic consumer prices. their effects on 
domestic consumers can be approximated using the IV'l'RC and CSE measures which can 
further be compared with the respective percentc.ge change in the consumer surplus. 
/'vPRC 
and 
-[OPpeC:- OJ'"nC:] 
Of'><nC2 
o/ot..CSI Border pnce 
~ F ~ ... ~P pt!C 
OJ\,nC 2 
- l'wl'pe/1 
OP wnC': 
Here. iv'PR(' underestimates the (absolute) amount of market distortion affecting 
consumers C.\'E. on the other hand, also underestimates the percentage change in 
consumer surplus at market prices 
and 
-I OPpeC:- Ol\,nC 2 ] 
Of'peC2 
- Pwl'pell 
OPpeC 2 
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-1' ~P pee 
0/'!'e('c 
Comparing both the results together, it is obvious that, 
%L1CS !lorderpnce> %L1CS .\lurkelpnce 'NPR(' > CSF. 
if the area Pj)Pen · enc If the area P,.Ppell -. CJI(:, then 
SJ'RC · thus seems to overestimate the market distortions as compared to the C.','L measure 
although /v'l'RC underestimates the distortion as compared to the consumer surplus at 
border prices 
All of these cases implicitly assumed the case of industrialized countries where 
domestic prices are usually kept at levels higher than the international prices to suppor1 
domestrc producers Such policies adversely affect consumer welfare as is depicted h)/ the 
negative values obtained in the case of these measures 
Next. assume the case of a small, poor agrarian economy where the aim of the 
government is to provide consumers with cheap food and, therefore, they institute policies 
that keep the food prices at levels below the international market. The earlier assumptions 
regarding the ineffectiveness of the country to influence the border prices or of the 
particular commodity to influence the foreign exchange rates, are still in effect 
Let P ~ be the price of the commodity in the world markets (Figure 5). At this 
price, assu;ning no distortionary policies in the domestic economy, output OQ1 is 
produced, ofv•hich the quantity OC is consumed domestically and the remainder, C1QJ. is 
exported The international price is higher than what would ensure the domestic 
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consumer sufficient consumption of the commodity Therefore_ the government imposes 
an export tax equivalent to the amount Pj)c~ per unit of output which decreases the 
domestic consumer and producer price to PJ 
The export tax thus induces changes in real variables Domestic production 
decreases to OQ2 , domestic consumption increases to ()( ·:> and exports are now ( ·_,Q, 
The price-induced income effects ofthis policy would result in the loss in producer surplus 
equal to the area PJF,,.c;e, ofwhich consumers gain PJ)uhd, and the government earns the 
area dfj;e in export revenues. In net national economic welfare terms, the deadweight loss 
1s equal to the triangles ~fd and egc. 
The estimation of the market dist011ion from the producers- point of vievv may be 
approximated using the /v'f(f) PSE and producer surpluses at border and market pnces 
and 
Ol',teCJ:- Ol'wf!.Q: 
()JJ,.,gQ: 
- l'j\.,ge 
()J'wf!.V2 
%l3.FSI. I Burc er pnce 
OPJcQ2- OPugQ: 
OP JCQ2 
-I' J!' wCe 
()J',..gQ: 
--Pdf' wee 
Ol'c~cQ2 
- l',tPuf!,C 
Ol'c~eQ 2 
Both i\'RF and J',)'E are smaller than the percent change in producer surplus at 
border and market price, respectively, by the area egc: However, although the absolute 
estimates of NRP and PSE are identical, in percentage terms, the NRP estimates 
underestimate the distortionary effects by less than the PSI-..-
%/JP5J' .Cfarketpnce ' %/JPSisorderpncc> NRP > PSE. 
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Evaluating the distortionary effects ofthe export tax on the consumers using 
\'l'RC ·. C.','F and consumer surplus measures yield the following 
and 
NFRC - [ 0/' JdC:- OP~fC":l () f'u/C2 
%L1CSI Hordu..- pnce 
-J 01' Jdc ':- Ol'u.W:] 
0 !',1dC 2 
o/ol1('SI .\f.nkcl ;;nee 
l'j'H hd 
()f'wfi '2 
Pc~Pwbd 
OJ' JdC 2 
1',)\fd 
()J'~fC ·= 
f'c~l'~fd 
() l',id ('2 
NP RC overestimates percent change in consumer surplus at border price b'l the 
area hfd Similarly, CSE also overestimates the percent change in consumer surplus at 
market price by the area hfd However, the estimate for CSI:' for this policy is greater than 
that for,\']'/((' In short, for the case of an export tax, ( 'SJ: and ,Vl'RC provide Identical 
absolute estimates yet differ in percentage terms 
NPR(' > %Ll('S!Burdcrpnce 
It should be noted that the market distortion captured by the NPRC and CSF 
measures mav also provide identical estimates of the level of distortion in case of any 
policy instruments that affect domestic prices only However, any policy that does not 
affect consumer prices would result in different estimates of these measures In that case, 
CSL would approximate the distortion levels more precisely than NPRC, which would fail 
to account for income transfer measures, like food stamps, as explained below 
F w1her assume that the government redistributes some part or all of its export tax 
revenues to provide an income support to the poor consumers, which shifts the demand 
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curve out to the right to D; (Figure 5). Consumer and producer prices remain below the 
international prices at Pd Consumption now increases to OC3 while output remains at 
Of): and, therefore, exports decrease to CQ~·. Consumer surplus is nmv J>d11 while the 
producer surplus remains unchanged at nF:e:' 
In this case, on the producer side, since there is no fwiher change in producer 
price and output the earlier results for the PSI:. NRJ', and producer surpluses at border 
and market prices would remain unchanged. The direct income transfer to the consumer 
would. however, change the estimates of protectionary effects on the consumer side, 
-;mce 
('SF= 
and 
NFRC -I O!',,'Jr·,- OJ\, zr·,J ()f).,/(', 
!' J !'., lj 
()f'~l(', 
0/ "-( '\.'1 
/ OLJ. ~._), Hur,ie~ 
IQc·f'c-·Qc·f\,)+(i)c+fc )Qc 
Qc·f'c +lJc.Qc 
%;\('S] 
'- .Harker pnc(! 
a h; d 
() f'" I (. :. 
- [Ol'd}c·l-- Of'wiCJ] +d/IJ 
0 p d)( .3 +dfij 
alzjd 
I'd!'~ I)+ d{ij 
O!'dJC 1 +d/z; 
Here C.\'f~ estimates are higher than those provided by the NPRC because NPRC fails to 
capture the income transfer subsidy to consumers Since NPRC accounts for only the 
wedge between the domestic and border prices but not the direct transfers to consumers, 
(·sf: provides a better measure of how government policies influence incentives for 
consumers This finding is also consistent with earlier studies.l2 The comparisons among 
the NRP and CSf:· with consumer surpluses at border and market prices yield ambiguous 
results 
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NPRC > %L1CS uarder 1,,c, tf/area P)\fd · ahmh, 
CSF > %LlCS \farierrnce ![[area P)\/} ahmh, 
and NPRC > %LlCSj1rarketpnce ~ffareaPJ)'"·bd · ahmh. 
Tables 5 through 7 provide calculations of NRP. PS!c·. NRPC and CSlc to support 
rhis analysis for small country. The small wheat-importing industrialized countries like 
'\onvay and Switzerland have market price support (lv!PS) greater than zero with different 
levels of direct and indirect producer support In case of absolute measurements 
(considering only the numerator ofNJU' and PSL), the existence of direct or indirect 
payment would result in higher estimates of PSF But where the percentage addition to 
numerator is smaller than the denominator. the!'.')'£ estimates would be lower than the 
.VRJ' For example, in Table 5. the lv'RP estimates t(!r Norway for 1980 are sm<lller than 
those provided by the J'SL measure, v,hile the reverse is true for 1990 In case of 
developing countries, like Nigeria and India, where MPS and direct payments are zero, 
NRJ' would be zero Here, f'SE would provide more accurate measures of distortion since 
it would capture any positive or negative indirect support, and thus would be significantly 
different from the NRP estimates. 
The greater the level of direct and indirect transfers, the more significant would be 
the difference in the estimates provided by these measures (Table 6) In Sweden, for 
example. the ?v'Rf' for I 990 is 240 percent while the PS'E is only 73 percent \Vhen the 
\IPS is not zero but there are no direct payments, such as for India, the absolute NRP 
estimates would exceed those of I'SE The differences among the estimates provided by 
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consumer protection measurement concepts are similarly different (Table 7) If domestic 
consumer price is less than the border price and there are some direct or indirect 
payments, the CSE' would always be larger than NPRC 
It may be useful to further analyze the case where the staple food commodity 
commands a large percentage of consumers· budget In that case, the change in prices will 
have real income effects This is particularly true in case of poor developing economies 
This case may be studied using the compensated demand analysis instead of the standard 
\1 arshallian demand curves 
/Heasuring Distortions in the Case of A Large Country 
Large industrialized wheat exp011ing countries in "vheat (the United States. the 
European Union, Australia and Canada) have also relied. besides other measures. upon 
export subsidies to safeguard the interests of their domestic producers The European 
Community has become a net exporter of most commodities, from being a net importer 
during the I 960s, by using variable levies and export subsidies Export subsidies alone 
accounted for about 30 percent ofthe total support provided to grain farmers The Union 
provided its wheat growers $7 09 billion through its trade measures designed to protect 
the domestic producers from \vorld price fluctuations (OECD. 199 I). The Australian 
\Vheat Board, on the other hand, manages the marketing of 80 percent of total Australian 
vvhcat production, which is sold in international markets. Domestic wheat prices have 
exceeded export prices, resulting in an assistance of about $7 per ton to the domestic 
producers (t1SDA. 1987) The recent policy trend for the United States is to rely more on 
export subsidies and deficiency payments (Gardner_ 1990a) The Canadian dairy industrv 
is characterized by extreme political involvement and protection and the Canadian dairy 
farmers received about $1.78 billion in 1 990 in market price supports including export 
subsidies (OECD_ 1991) The following case analyzes the distortions caused by such 
subsidies in large exporting countries which face an upward sloping excess demand curve 
( FJ)) by the rest of the world (Figure 6) 
Let the vvorld price be P" at which the domestic production is 0(} 1 and domestic 
consumption is OC The quantity C1Q1 is exported, which equals OX1 in panel (B) 
Domestic producers lobby for higher output prices and the government agrees to provide 
an export subsidy of P)J ... per unit of output This raises the domestic price to F1 and also 
induces changes in real variables Domestic consumption decreases to(}(·- and domestic 
production increases by (J:Q: Expor1s are now C:Q1. which is equal to ( JX_- The 
consumer surplus decreases by the area P ... Pada whereas the producer surplus increases bv 
JY"P,,ch. resulting in a net gain ofadch, which is equal to the areaghFPwin panel (B). 
The increase in exports shifts the excess supply in the world market to E\,'1- therebv 
decreasing the world price to 1\-1 . The cost to the government of exporting country is 
given bv the amount of exp011s times the difference between the domestic price and the 
nev, vvorld price I-1ence the cost of the policy is kdcm, which is equivalent to the area 
;hFPw 1 in panel (B). Ofthis cost, the producers' gain is adcb (or ghP)Jw)- The lower 
prices in the world markets increase the consumer surplus ofthe importing countries by 
the area;y/\)\, 1 , leaving the net economic loss to the world ofjhg. Of this loss, the 
33 
exporting country bears the portion ihR. which equals the sum ofthe two triangles eda and 
hcf in panel (A), while the rest, area;iR. is borne by the rest of the world 
The distortions in the exporting country's economy caused by the export subsidy 
can be approximated by NRP and PSE and compared with the distortion estimates 
provided by the Marshallian producer surplus measures In absolute values, the NR!' and 
J'SL estimates would be identical and would overestimate the distortion. However, in 
percentage terms, the estimates of distortion obtained using the NRP would be higher than 
those obtained from PSE. Moreover, both these estimates would exceed the producer 
surplus estimates by the area P,.hcm Overall, the NRP would overestimate the distortion 
bv a larger amount as compared to the P.\L. which would overestimate the distortion at 
market prices but would underestimate it at the border prices 
The analysis reveals that the large exporting countrv loses by maintaining domestic 
prices above the world price levels and the domestic economy witnesses the redistribution 
of mcome from con:umers and taxpayers to the domestic producers and foreign importers 
Compared to a small country case, when a large country raises its domestic prices above 
international prices, it depresses the international prices and the cost to the domestic 
economy is much higher than is reflected in gains to domestic producers. The level of the 
distortion due to the export subsidy for a large exporting country, as measured by the NRJ' 
andl'Sl:'. reveals that both these measures clearly overstate the actual extent of distortion 
The differences in the estimates provided by these measures are also substantiated 
in Tables 8 through 10 As discussed earlier, where MPS is zero but producers are given 
positive direct payments, the PSI:' estimates would always be greater than NRP 
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since NRJ' would be zero, as is the case of United States (wheat) for 1990 (Table 8) On 
the contrarv, \Vhen MPS is positive but there are no direct or indirect payments, the l'SJ: 
estimates would be smaller than those of NRP because in these countries, domestic prices 
are maintained above the world prices In low-income countries like Argentina that tax 
domestic farmers and provide no direct payments but provide positive indirect subsidies, 
the numerator of PS'f' would be smaller, resulting in different estimates 
Likewise, in the case oflarge importing countries with a significant positive price 
wedge, the NRP estimates would far exceed those of PS!c' (Table 9) The l'v'RPC and (',')'!:' 
estimates would be negative for large industrialized countries that maintain higher 
consumer prices as compared to the v,:orld prices (Table 1 0) The higher this wedge, the 
smaller would be the ('SF as compared to the ,VRJ'( ·· 
:'Vfeasurement r~f Protection Levels Under Price Discrimination13 
fn many countries, the governments set up agencies that have monopoly control in 
important food grains and manage domestic supply and international trade in order to 
influence domestic prices (Anderson and Tyers, 1992). For example, the Japanese Food 
Agcncv, Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), and the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) arc 
engaged in such efforts. The A WB has had a monopoly on marketing of wheat overseas 
and domestically The board has long been administering domestic wheat prices above 
international levels Although the domestic wheat marketing has almost been deregulated 
since 1989. the A WB still exercises monopoly power over marketing of wheat exports, 
\\ h1ch constitute about 80 percent of total production (Edwards, 1990) In the case of 
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many developing countries, government agencies, such as Food Corporation ofTndia and 
\iational Logistics Agency of Indonesia, also hold monopoly power to maintain control 
over domestic prices and engage in international trade. These agencies, however_ maintain 
domestic prices belmv the international prices in order to ensure accessibility to cheap 
food for poor people 
ln the case of industrialized countries where domestic prices are usually maintained 
above the world price level, these agencies may engage in price discrimination. Assuming 
that the world market price of an agricultural commodity is determined competitively, it 
becomes important to analyze the effects of the distortions caused by the actions of these 
agencies 14 It is of further interest whether such policies may result in biased estimates of 
protection levels using the l\'Rf' and 1'.'-J'l: measures 
Consider the case vvhere the monopolist is facing a perfectly elastic demand tn the 
world markets but a downward sloping demand in the home market (Figure 7) I 5 First 
assume that the world market price, P w 1 , which is also the competitive marginal revenue, 
is such that domestic marginal revenue curve, MK is evel)'Where below Pw 1 The total 
output produced at this price is OQ1 but, since no domestic buying occurs, all of this 
output is exported In this case, the total revenues for the monopolist are OP 111 aQ: Of 
this area. (~fa Q I represents the total variable costs and the Marshall ian producer surplus 
ts given by the areaf p "' 1 a. Moreover, since no domestic price exists at which any 
buying mav occur, the NHJ' and PSI:' may not be defined. 
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Now assume that the world market price drops to Pw: and. thus, it becomes 
feasible for the monopolistic agcncv to engage in price discrimination The total output 
produced in this case would be OQ: at point c where the foreign marginal revenue curve 
intersects the marginal cost curve, A1C Ofthis total output, the monopolist will be able to 
sell OQ, in the domestic market at price P J 1 , which is higher than the world price The 
remaining output, Q3Q2 , will be exported The producer surplus isf/)J: bdc, which is 
equivalent to the areas fP" 2 c - P w: P J 1 hd. AsP J 1 > P ": , the producer receives an 
mcrease in revenue equivalent to Pw,Pd
1 
hd due to price discrimination. These estimates 
of producer surplus in the commodity market can now be compared \vith the estimates of 
distortion provided by the NR/' and PSI: Here, two scenarios can be analyzed first. the 
case \Vherc trade is ignored and only domestic consumption is considered. and. second, 
where both domestic consumption and exports are considered In the first case. the 
estimates of NRF and J'SE would be 
NPR OP"1 hQ,- Ol'w2 dQ, Of'v..dQ 3 
()}'d1 hQ3 -01',..2 dQ3 
()fldlhQ, 
f'v.2l'd1 bd 
0Pd
1 
bQ, 
The total producer surplus, considering total output. OQ:, is equal to the areafPc~ 1 bdc 
Here. the N/U' and PSJ,· estimates clearly understate the total producer surplus at border 
and market price, respectively, by the areafP w 2 c. Nevertheless, the NRP estimate is 
consistent with the change in the producer surplus at border price due to price 
discrimination by the monopolist, which creates the wedge P w,P d 1 and the change in 
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producer surplus is P "' P d 1 hd The estimate for P.')J~' would compare similarly vvith the 
change in producer surplus at the market price 
Next, when trade is considered, the .NRP and PSF measures \Vould m·erestimate the 
above change in producer surplus by the area bdhc: 
NPR 
PSE 
or dl Q:h - OQ:cl' Wo 
CJQ,cJ' 
OQ 2h!'J 1 - O!J 2ci',., 
OQ:hl' J 1 
f'w 2 chPc~ 1 
OChci' 
M 0 
f'v. 2 ch!'d 1 
OQ2hl'a, 
However, the overestimation is less for PSE as compared to the NRP estimates when trade 
is considered If, due to increased competition in the international market, the world price 
falls down to somewhere between p "' and r' domestic consumer welfare would increase. 
The increase in consumer surplus would clearly be much higher in the case where there is 
no price discrimination The PSJ:' and lv'RP estimates vmuld still be biased upwards The 
monopolist would lose due to falling world prices The monopolist would be able to 
recover some of the loss by exercising price discrimination in the domestic market as 
compared with the case where world price was allowed to prevail in the domestic market 
Next. suppose that the world market price is too low, say at/\,,, such that/\.., is 
less than the monopolist's average total cost at all output levels In this case, the domestic 
monopoly situation prevails and no trade occurs. The monopolist would operate at g 
\Vhere the monopolist's marginal cost and marginal revenue curves intersect and would 
charge the maximum price that the consumers are willing and able to pay (P d,) for the 
output OQJ tc, The producer surplus will then bef P d, eg and both NRP and PSE would 
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overestimate the distortion in domestic markets by the area PwJ:rzJ 17 The percent l'SF 
would_ however, overestimate the distortion by less amount than the percent :VR!' 
estimate 
APR 
OPd,eQ4 -Ol\,3jQl 
Of'u ,jQ4 
0/'d, cQ4 -- 0!\,,iQ-l 
(!f' J, ei)J 
I' w 3l J, e; 
Of'w3/)4 
P,.,F_J,CJ 
0!' 1 , e(J_, 
Although this example illustrates an extreme case, it is not far from the situation in 
some industrialized countries where domestic producers face very lmv international prices 
vet manage to get a higher domestic price for their output In some cases, the controlling 
agencies may also establish export subsidies to compensate producers for overproduction 
which is then exported at international prices The cases where such subsidies arc 
prc)\'Jded are relativeh- complicated to analyze However_ t\vo such cases are discussed 
below vvhere domestic consumers and producers are subsidized by direct payments 
Consider first the case of a direct consumer subsidy The world price is }J, and 
domestic production is OQ 1, of which OQ2 is consumed domestically at price }J J_ and the 
rest, Q:Qi, is exported (Figure 8) A per unit subsidy equivalent to nh would shift up the 
curve A}(, to AH1 and 1HK to A!R, 1, as shown in the figure 18 The total domestic 
production remains unchanged at OQ 1 since the monopolist's MC curve and the foreign 
,HR curve do not change_ However, due to increased demand in domestic market, it 
becomes profitable for the price discriminating monopolist to sell more output in the 
domestic market at a higher price, p d, _ Since the domestic sales increase to OQs, expor1s 
drop to Q-Q. At the total output produced, the PSE (and l'lRP) overestimate the 
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distortions by the area hhKc Note, hmvever, that without the subsidv, the l'SF 
overestimate vvas equivalent to the area aiJC Whether the overestimation is less or more 
now depends on whether the area aikb is more or less than the area kh:<J It mav be 
fur1her noted that the demand and lv!R curves may shift in such a wav as to leave the 
domestic price unchanged after the subsidy. In that case, the PSF estimates would be less 
b1ased by the area aikb as compared to the case without the subsidy 
Since PSF is the sum of two types of government policies, the wedge between the 
border and domestic prices, and the direct and indirect transfers to agricultural producers. 
the absolute estimates of FSE and NRP do not differ in the case where income transfers are 
made to consumers only The C.')'J,·, on the other hand, vvould capture these budgetary 
transfers from the government to consumers. and would, therefore. provide relatlvcly 
accurate estimates as compared to the Nl'RC 
CSF 
NPRC = 
rJTd: hQ_,- UFw f-.(}3 
OP., h!J:. 
UPd 2 hQ3- (~f}w hQ:. +mfJd:_ hn 
!)['d: h(h 
= 
fJwfJd
2 
hb 
-----
f'~f'd 2 hh +mPd2 hn 
0Pd 2 h(h 
The Nl'RC measure fails to capture direct consumer transfers Therefore, the NPRC' 
underestimates the distm1ion compared to CSJ:· by the amount of government 
expenditures The consumers now consume higher quantities but also the domestic price 
has risen from P J 1 toP d:. Therefore, the consumers gain the area sthx, but lose the area 
f!dJ;d: xi Therefore, the overall effect on consumers is ambiguous Moreover, the 
comparison of CSJ:· and NPRC with the consumer surplus at border and market prices, 
respectively, is also inconclusive. 
40 
:\low, assume that instead of consumer subsidy, the government provides specific 
input subsidy to farmers \Vhich shifts the marginal cost curve dmvn to AfC; (Figure 9) 
The output increases to 0(}2 However, since domestic demand remains unchanged, the 
domestic component of price discrimination is unaffected and the consumers still consume 
at OC, Exports increase to C:Qc from CCJ1 The producer surplus increases by the area 
!dhx to jl)d eag The numerator of lv'Rl' measures the area P ,P d kx Whether the area J 'J); 
kg is greater or less than the areafdhg would depend upon the elasticities and the extent of 
the shift Compared with the no input subsidy case, the overestimation by NRJ' here 
\vould increase by the area hhkg. The P,)'J~·, which would also include the amount of 
government expenditures, nPwxm, would provide even more inflated estimates ofthe 
distortion The comparison ofthese rneasures with the respective percentage change in 
producer surplus would still be ambiguous 
ln short, the graphic analysis in this section examines how different intervention 
policies distort producer and consumer incentives Under highly simplistic assumptions, 
the analys1s compares and contrasts the level of distortion captured by different methods 
of measurement The market distortion captured by the NJU) and l'SE and NRJ'C' and CSF 
measures vvould provide identical estimates of the level of distortion where the market 
distortion is translated into the wedge between border and domestic prices. There are 
certain policies that result in distortions that do not affect the wedge In that case, P,','J~' or 
cs;~ estimates would be closer to the actual effects whereas the NIU) and NRPC would fail 
to account for them. There are certain policies whose effects and the direction of change 
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would not possibly be captured by any ofthese measures In such cases, empirical 
examination ofthe effects becomes desirable 
Summary 
This paper provides an analytical overview ofthe political economy market of 
agricultural protection. A comprehensive comparative analysis of different measurement 
concepts and their respective policy coverage is discussed Finally, a graphic exposition of 
the policy effects captured by some selected measurement concepts is provided under 
many different scenarios and market conditions. The choice of the measurement concept 
that emerges from the analysis apparently favors the producer subsidy equivalent on the 
basis of its comprehensive and \vider coverage of different policies and its suitabilitv to 
analvze the extent of government intervention. 
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Endnotes 
Hm1c\ cr. the FRP measure would include the dcficicncv payments if these distort the output price (sec 
Table l) 
2 Kmeger also emphasizes that indirect interventions in agriculture seem to be much more important 
than the direct support policies Discrimination against agricultural commodities in policies external 
to agricultural has a greater impact on agricultural incentives than do policies aimc.l dirccth at 
agriculture This is mamly true in case of developing economics of the Third World 
Hmvc\cr. although the \'RP measures partially make up for the shortcoming bv \irtuc of the case of 
their calculations. the Jj~f' measure is neither complete nor CIS\ to calculate The JJ(J' calculations 
arc quite stringent since they imohc estimating .\R.fJ for the final comrnodlt\ . . \RPC for all 
mterrncd1atc inputs. and technical informatJOn on input-output coefficients. which arc notorious!~ 
difficult to obtain on a representative basis (Schwartz and Parker. 1988) 
-+ LRP calculations. at times. may include direct payments such as deficiency pavments that translate 
d1rectly into output price effects 
'i The USDA. ERS calculations. hm1cvcr. make no distinction bct\\ccn the direct and llldirect assistance 
to the consumers. as is evident from Table 1. 
(, Slllcc tr:1dc distort10nan implications of agricultmal policies arc not Indicated b' the l'Srs. 
Roningcn and Dix1t ( 1991) han· proposed the ··trade distorted by support .. measure ( TnS) to 
·mcasmc the change in the \Oiumc of net trade from existing levels if a count I) complete!\ elinunates 
all support to the commodity·· 
1 The PSEs may be expressed either as a percentage of the value to producers. in monetary units per ton. 
or in total monetary value of transfers. 
8 Some adjustments in this case arc suggested by Josling and Tangcrmann (1989) that \\Ould mosth 
benefit in the frame\\Ork of studies of trade models dealing \Yith the effects of liberalization rather 
than the studies on the extent and reasons of gm crnmcnt inter.-ention 
9 In order to quali(y for assistance under the US gmcrnrnent's set-aside program (\\hich is aimed at 
restricting production acreage under the grain support program). a certain percentage of a producer· s 
base acreage must be left fallow. The normal Dcx acreage is about 15 percent of the base. with an 
additional I 0 percent under optional flex acres. Producers do not receive deficiency payments on these 
flc\ acres although alternative crops may be planted on this land. For a detailed discussion. sec Note 3 
in BraY rl a! 
1 IJ i\ssummg that this policy docs not shift the supply curve but rather results in increase in the quanti tv 
supplied 
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II Although the absolute measures ofPSE and NRP would provide Identical estimates in this case. 
comerting them into percentages. the two measures \ielcl different results. Since 111 most of the 
studies. the PSEs and NPRs arc used in percentage terms. the aboYc conclusion seems more 
meaningful 
12 Sec. for e:-;amplc. Josling and Tangcrmann (l <JS<J). Sclmart1. and Parker (l ')88 ). and Gardner ( 198%) 
l' Although some studies have analy1.ecl price discrimination. the following discussion represents the 
first s:- stcmatic demonstration of price discrimination in the contc:-;t of c:-;tcnt of distortion 
captured bv alternative measures of protection 
l.f Price discrimination is generally defined as the situation \Yhcrc anv product produccclunclcr smglc 
control is sold at different prices to different buyers (Robinson. 1 ')38) 
I~ It is being assumed here that both markets arc separable \lith no arbitrage possibilities. different 
price elasticities e:-;ist, and in cases discussed below. that the domestic gm-crnmcnt bars imports 
from impinging upon the monopolized domestic market with no similar restrictions by other 
countries that might affect this country's e:-;ports. 
J(, lt mav be noted that the \\Oriel pnee may decrease l'cu1her \lith no change In the domestic price and 
Olltj}llt 
17 Hmve1er. It must be noted that the foreign price component in this case is arbitrarv and could be 
amthlllo 
"' 
18 It may be noted here that an ud valorem subsidy \Youlcl alter the slopes of the .'1/? and .lfl? cuiYes 
bct\\CCn the pre- and post-subsidv scenarios. The overall policy effects in this case can be shown 
analogous to the per unit subsidv case analy!.ccl bciO\\ and are not discussed separately. 
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Table 1 Comparison of alternative agricultural protection measurement concepts 
/vfeos7lrC men! Conccpl a Acronrm 
------------------------
0/ominal Protc:ctwn Coc!Tic1ent 
0/onumil Rate of Protectwn 
Nominal I<.ate of Protcctwn for 
'lommal Rate of Ass1stancc 
FfkctJVC Rate of Protection 
Ulcl'tJ\'e Rate or J\ssistancc 
D1rcct Nmmnal Protection Rate 
InJJrcct Nommal Protection Rate 
Iota! Nommal Protection Rate 
l'roduccr Suhsidv Equivalent 
Producer Subsidy Equivalent, Trade 
Distortwn Variant 
Consumer Suhsidv Equivalents 
Trade; Distortton h\ Support 
1\ggrcgatc Measure of Support. 
Ci.\Tl 
.\'PC' 
VRP 
.\'R.-1 
LRP 
.\PRr 
PSE 
PSEm 
CSL' 
7VS 
.L\1.\ 
netim/J(}fl ·' 
Q ( 1',t- 1'" 1 (_) • F. 
(_) {( l'd (:!) -!'. / () . 1'. 
ri:J"-I:L1 l>L 
{(I >1.~ - ,)) - I: 1;, / I : L 
{Q(l'p -1'.! • LJ 1- L/ {(_) ·i', · [)- 1/ 
- {(_).!/',- !'.) ((j . !'.) 
• _\',, - 1) • .'~1 • \ 
--~-~- - ----------~--- ----·------ .. 
() • .<: • • 
Th~ measurement ~.:onccpb refer to the protection k\·cb for a :-;mgk agncu!tural commod1t~· J !t)\\'C\·cr_ thc;.;c CJ.ll cJsil:-· bt: aggn:gaktl 
to reflect u\·crJ.ll prnkction to the agri..:ultural SCL'tor Percentage \'<.tlucs ..:J!I hl' ch:-ri\\~d b~ mult1pl: ing thL· cad1 measure hy I ()(J 
except the T1'JS and .-L\fS. 
h rhc YariJhlcs used are ddint.•J as: !\-:Domestic Producer Price: P ... : \\'orld price (measured 111 domestic currenc: ): 
(_): Dom.:;tic production: OJ: Set of other 'ubsidics ta:' on output (including ddlcicncv payments): C .\djustmcnt for di!Tcrcnccs in 
qualitY. storage. transportation. handling costs and other margins: C· AdJustment f(Jr diflcrcnces in qualitv, storage, transpot1ation. 
handling costs and other margins rnea..;;ured under competitive C(\nditions: PN..., Price index of non-agricultural sector: p'.'/ 4: Price indc:x. 
of non-agricultural sector in the absence oftrack distortions: E .. :\ominal oflicial exchange rate: E'· Equilibrium exchange rate lfl the 
absence of intcrwntion: > :.Jd: Value Added per unit uf output at domestic prices: I :'L: Value Added per unit of output at world prices 
(measured in domestic currency): 8: AssisLtnL'e on Jll outputs and inputs: D: Direc1 transfers to agricultural producers: 1: Inchrect 
transkrs (hudgcttry-financed suppm1) to agricultural producers: L: Agricultural produc~r levies . .P,: The ""Poli...:y". "Inl'Cntl\·c" or 
··shadn\\" price nfthe commodity that wnuld keep the output tht.? same as the current policies if all policies were rcmu\ ~.,_·d. and .::: 
0\\11-pricc \Upp\~· and demand (ncgati\'t.?) elasticities, rcspecti\·dy: S"l: \1arkd surr~)rt rat ins, sl' and .S':· Direct incornc support raks f~)l 
pr\)duu.'r.\ and L'OllSlllllCrs, rcspt:cti\'ely: G_J. Quantity :._'onsumcd, sso Sct-<L'lide onSet rcsultmg 1!-om direct payments to producers.~!· 
Output pruduccd 1Il tmle rL·riod t: Pr:' The "Policy'' Price ofthc commodity in pl'riod t: P'<'av~_·· Fix~d reference price hascd 011 the ~·car~ 
198fl-~S. gcncrallv the average fo.h. unit value for the commoditv in a net e.-;porting country and the average c.i.f unit value for the 
commodity in and in1porting countr:·· in the hasc period. measured in domestic currency: ,P Thl' consumer price ofthc commodit~·­
,:nd De· BudgetarY-financed a..'->sistancc to consumers. 
Scmrces: Brav, C., T Josling and J. Cheri ow ( 1992). ".-\djustm~nl' for Set-aside Acres in Agricultural Trade r\grcemenK ;\n Example 
lr•)m the C:unda-1 · S Free Trade Agreement." Canadwn Journal ofAgncultural 1:-cononucs, 40 (I): 25-35: CahilL C and W I .egg 
' 1 <l'lO). "Estimation of' Agricultural A5sisl3ncc l 'sing Producer and Consumer Subsidv Equivalent': TI1eorv and Practice .. , OF!'!J 
!:.cc;"om;c Si1id1es. I 'l (\\'inter 1 9X9 90): 13-43: Krueger. A 0 . \L Schiff. A \'aides ( 1991 ). The Polilicul Economy ofAgnculturul 
.''•·;c:nc; l'c,lzcies. \'ol. I-\·. Jolm Hopkins l'niwrsity Press: Baltimore. \Ill: Roningen. \·. 0. and P. \I Di:-:it (1991 ). ~fcaq1ring 
. \gr~c·ultural Trade Distortions: :\Simple Approach. Agriculture and Trade .-\nalysrs ])i,·ision. Economic Research Ser>tce. t;SLJ,\. Stalf 
Rcpon ,\:;i·.S 91-1'. Decem her 19'J I. W;Lshington, DC., Schwartz,:-.:. E. and S. Parker (19gX), "\kasuring Go\·cnuncnt Intervention tn 
-\gnculture !elf· the' :xn :"egotiations" .·lmencan Journal o(~gncullural EconomJcs. 70 (5): 1137-11-15: Josling. T. and S 
I an~emnnn (I 0X9). "\k:tsuring L~,·els of Protection in Agriculture:,\ Survey of Approaches and Rcsulb.'' in AJlen ~launder and 
\lheJ1o \'aides ieds) Agnculture und Governments 111 an Interdependent World. Aldershnt: Gower Puhlishing Company. 
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Table 2 Policy effects captured by alternative protection measurement concepts 
l'olicy meas11rc" Prod11cer 
/v'l'C NRP NRA NI'Hr) l'/PH1 1\'l'Rr ERJ' 
.\/arket Price Support 
Border Measures x 
Domestic Pnce Support \ 
Market Board & State \ 
Other Output !'rice \ 
J)irect Payments 
I lct!ciencv Pavments 
Dtsastcr !'anncnts 
Crop Insurance 
Producer Levtes 
Income Stahihzation 
Input Assistance Policies 
Pnman TJlput Pohcics 
lntennecl!atc Input 
.\larketinK .·lssistance 
;\dvtson and Inspection 
i·ran«portatton 
!nfrastmcture .·lssistal!ce 
Research and L\tcnston 
Land lmprcnemcnt 
lrrn:atwn 
Fcol!omy-wide Policies 
State and :\mwnal 
raxatton and Other 
Consumer Assi~tance l'olicies 
Consumer Price f'oltcies 
Consumer l·ood Donations 
Other Consumer 
X 
X 
\ 
\ 
\ 
X X X \ 
\ X \ \ 
\ .\ \ X 
X \ X \ 
h 
\ X \ 
\ 
X \ 
\ 
Cons11mer 
1'.\F NR!' ( '.\F 
\ \ '\ 
\ \ \ 
' 
'\ '\ 
\ \ 
' 
' 
\ 
' 
\ 
\ 
X 
\ 
\ 
'\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
l 
d 
\ \ 
'· 
\ 
---~-~---
H<~rdcr \kasurt:\ al~q) indud;: the cfl~cl\ oftarifl~, quota.'< \·:1riahlc k\·ics, export subsidies. Other l)Utput policies m~l} in.:ludc pn..:c 
pr~._·mJUllL 1\\0-tl.._'rcd pricing s:-stcms and price stabilization scheme;., Primary: mput-.; n1ay incluJe purchased inputs Sth:h ~L':i fueL 
t'.?r1tlizcr. chemicals and di;-;case control mc<L<;urcs. Ex:-tmples of an inkrn11.·diak input subsidies would incluck f~cd suh~idics on meat 
pr,Jdt~c·tion The estimates of CSEs as calculated bv OECD ( 1991) have explicitly assumed the equinlcnce of producer and consumer 
prices and have used th-: f:ln11g:1te or producer prices in their calculations ofCSEs. Ilowcvcr, since it is ohsel\·cd that at times. the 
prnduc-::r and l·on:·;umcr pril·cs ma:,: differ signifi\.:antly, it is more appropriate to recognize the diJl(:n::nces in the t\vo and usc the 
,)hsl'f\'t?d ..::on:--.umcr prices in the estimation ofC~\J:~s. Other consumer subsidies include both direct and indircct transfers to consumas 
It mav he noted that LSI J,\, ERS calculations ofCSEs ( 1990) do not make any distinctions between these direct <md mdirect transfers. 
h ·111c lo'!l? ca leu l.ttions include the deficicncv pa\·mcnls in case \\here such pavmenls directly affect input prices or production of output 
St1tc and nat1onal pohci..:-5 includ~? programs adminiskred by state. provincial or national gov~mmenls which tax or subsidize 
agncuitural pruJucef'. such a.s st:tk programs in the r·.s., provmcial programs in Canada and national programs in the F.C The LSfJ,\ 
r I '!9r!"l ,·akulatrons of !'SFs include the elfccts of these policies in case of the l rs. and Canada only 
d Other c~-onm11\"-Wid~ policies such as taxation and exchange rate policies have an important hut indirect impact on agricultural rctun1s 
,J (I '!c1 I-,. ruhfe, of!'roducer Suhs1d1· Fqwva!ems and Consumer Subs1dv Fqruvolents: 19-9-90, OCDL Cill r91) 128. Paris: 
\\' ... +h a] ~ 1 (J9rJ). r..·sr:rnutes ofPruducer dnd ('onsumer Subs1dy Eqlllvalents: Governmcnr lnrerventJon tn .·lgnculrure. J IJ8]-(\'-:. LSD.-\ 
St;tlistk.ll llullctin :\''· X03: Washington, D.C., CSDA, ERS ( 1938), .~gncuiture 1n the Uruguay Round: /I nalys1s o(Cwvenmrenr Support, 
\>;,nculturc and Trade Analvsis Division, Staff Report ,\CiFS880802, December: Washington, D.C.: Schwartz,?'<. E. and S. Parker (I nx ). 
··\k:Nrrrng Ciovcmment lnterYention in Agriculture for the GATf :\egotiations," Amen can Journal o{A:z.nculwrai t:cononucs, 70 (5 ): 
I I '"· i I~': Cahill. C and \'v' Legg ( !990), "Estimation of..\gricultural ,\>sistance l:sing Producer and Consumer Suhsidv Equivalents: 'llJCorv 
.md Pr:ktlo..';:," E.::nn0m1c 5:tuciles. \\'intl"r 1989 90: 13--t~. 
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Table 3. Policies covered under !'Sf:· calculations by OECD and USDA 
Policies USDA OECD 
Market Price Support 
Ditcct Income Support 
Research and E.\tenston 
Producer Le\ ies 
Priman Input Policies 
Intermedian Input Policies 
I nfrastmcture Support 
E.\ change Rate Controls a 
Marketing Assistance h 
Sub-Nat tonal Policies' 
Admmtstratt\C Costs 
Social Securit\ Benefits 
Subsidies to Agribusiness Sector 
General Income Ta.\ Policies 
Voluntan· E.\port Restraints '1 
The c!l'ccb ufc'\L·hangc: rate dt:-.tnr1ion.c; arc captured primanl~ m the cstimaks nfFSJ:.:s in case ofdevdoping countriL's onl:·; whc:rl..' 
<.:LJh<.;tantnJ Jiff.:rcnccs C\iq hd\\l:Cil t!Jc: ofliciaJ and unofliciaJ t?.\changc rates. ,\1orcOVL'f. thc: f(.']ativcJy Jar~3C' S17C nrthc agrarian Sl:L'tC'tl 
111 thc:sc ..._(~untnt.·s impltC\ that c.\l'hangc rate distut1ion:-. \\OI..JlJ translak intn greater impacts on thl'" ovcr::tll agnL·u!tural s~..·ctor than 
n·nuld hL' the ct;.;c m industrializcd countncs. 
h I11c UEr 'D calculatinns aggrcg:1tc ~dl otht:r suppott that docs not dir~ctly rdatcd to produc~r income hut constitutes hudgdaf} 
c'\pcndtturc" rnto a c0mposik '·g~ncral services·· categor:'. 
·n,e suh-nat1oml policies in case ofUSIJA calculations include such policies for onlv tv.o countries, narnclv. the l·nited States and 
Canada 
d \'nlunt.:u-~; cxpu11 restramto; .1greements ~.:an he intcf11rctcd :lS implicitly included in th~ir effects on border n1c3.surcs 
Sc,urccs \\chh . ..\..\I. Lopez and R. Penn (1990). Estnnares o(Prnducer and Consumer Subsidy Fquivalenrs.· (jovernment 
-'C~ren•en1lon 1n .·1;;ncu!rure. I 9S:'-8~, !;~;D,\. ERS. Statistical Bulletin 'io 803, .-\pril: Washington DC., t)ECD ( 1991), Tables of 
l'rnduccr Suhsidv Equi\ aknls and Consumer Suhsidv Equi\·alcnls: 1979-90. OCDE· GD (91 )128, Paris; t:sD,\. EKS ( 19X7), [jovanmenr 
.'nrt-:r··,y:ntlon u?.·l'::!.ncw'run..;· .\Icosurement. !:'vu!uouon. and Imphcatlonsfor Trade "Vegotwtwns. Foreign .-\gncultural Economic R~port 
:\o 22') . . \pril Washingtcm. ]) C., Josling, T. and S. Tangennann, ( 19WJ), Idea-suring Levels of Protection in Agriculture: A Survcv of 
\pprn:~.:hcs and Pesult~.·, in.-\. ~Llunder Jnd :\. \-aldCs (cds.), ..igncultu.re and Governments in an Interdept>ndent H'orlJ J)rucet:dm>~,.\ 
o(r~Ie "\~r~ fnr~ rnGtlonal Conf~rence of.{r;ncultu.rull:'conom;sts, :\ugust. Dartmouth: Brookfield, VT 
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Table 4. Standard deviations ofproduct-spccific and aggregate PS!cs for India 
____ --~per_c~nlJ 
( 'onnnodll> /9)] /983 }9'-,.f /9\\5 /981) /987 Srd /in'IU{/!JII'' 
-- ------------- ---- -------- ~---· ---·--
Corn -12 -7 -38 -5(, -1 () -l 5') ox 
Cotton. Long -2 -23 -19 -5 23 -J(, 5~ -; ; 
Cotton, Medium 22 -15 2 2 ,~ ~-' -1 1 5(1-, 1 
Peanuts 6 28 2'\ IX -~ -2') 59 29 
Rapeseed 2X ~2 23 2-l 57 80 (,5 
Rice -20 2 5 -8 ]() -l 12.29 
Sorghum -]9 -] 1 -32 --lO -23 -10 'itU 
SO\ beans -1-l -12 --l5 - )(, -25 11 !Jl 5-l 
\Vhcat -6 
' 
-7 -19 -1 -: 12.25 
All Commodities -11 2 () -12 
" 
2 (I 
----------- ·--- ·------------- --- ----- ---------~ --- ---
J"h:: :-:tandard d.._·\·iation of P.\'[:.'s of\·arious cormnoditics represent tk\·lations across the years in ind1\·idual }J,c.,·r~s from the \\L'lghkd 
a\·cragc in that >car 
\l)ur,:cs. PSF figures arc taken from \Vehh. 1\ .. \I. I ,opez and R Penn ( 1990). F...'.\·Umdlcs c~(ProJucer unJ Cnnsumer _-;,·uhsu~t' 
/.u:u\·uicnts: Cfovcrnment Jmervent:on ;nAgnc·u!ture. 198:!-8-. LSD:-\, ERS. Statisti...:al Bulletin ~n. X03. April, 1990· \\'a~htngton DC 
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Table 5 Extent of distortions captured by l'•/R.P and l'SE Small impor1ing countries 
/c'ii! l)nmestzc nomesuc Direct lnJirect 
/~uli?r<!nce /'rodu.c..:r PrnJuctnm Payments: Poyments' 
Pnce" 
~-~---~ 
IP.) (f',) (I) 
\'(lr\i'O~' rH"hco! I 
1no ')() 3. 7 10gc. G.1 20 
19')() S02 ') 3189 224 24 
,··.ru:.er!.i;nd i( 'omttlon l~ "heat) 
1 ')I; I: .VJ2.1 ')()() 372 12 .10 
]<)l)() 277.9 1029 530 -3_1 
\1genu 
1n: 2XO 2RO 0 -0 91 
l 'JSr1 52(: 520 1' (J 1 '!' 
36.00() II 
1'-q 1 74·1 44.000 0 -24:l(,(j 
··---~~--------
.\/'!{ 
(Percent) 
() { 1\J - I' w} p •• Q 
·----
_(/J{U!_I::G-%37' ~ l.l 
(63-.;963.7) 
_12·H 31 ~-g02J.l ~ 297 
(224xX02 9) 
37_2{21]_6-392.1} ~ 1~6 
(372x."l92.l) 
5.10{ 1029-277 .2l ~ 170 
(530x277.9) 
0.02G{2SO-~-~~ o 
(0.02f,x280 J 
_f2 CU~2U:_i~_Q~ = n 
(II() 1 '>x'>2(! I 
_36{ 15G'i:Jl.§.~~ o 
(36x15G5) 
±±.1_1744-l]:l_.±l_~ II 
(44x17·14) 
(l'crc·cnt) 
0.061l_li)St>-_2_(J.1"]j_~2"~· 20 _ <s 
(0 OG~-.;IIJ~6i· 2~ 
_Q~~_±{;ll_8_2:_~02~JJ._~_1{L:._ .:?-1 o ;c) 
(0 22.Jxl 1 ~') 1 · 41> 
0.37l.f2_(,(c:_}'!_2J'' 12' 30 ~ 69 
(O._l7'2.\~6G) · 12 
_0 5J!l_{_l_(J29-277.')~:l_1_~~~- Sl 
(I! s1rh 1 IJ2'-' 1-.n 
_() 02_1~{_2-'~IJ-:2_c'I_(J__L_IJ:_Oc'J I " 12:' 
(II 02(•\2811'1' () 
JLQ_L~l~~-G~~~~_:__l \)'\- 2.:: 
{(I (I] .:;\52(1) II 
_}_G 1 15(J5-15CJ5l·[L-L-=~-~= -'12!1 
(lG\ I "<'5)~ 0 
44_(_]744-17·J.Ii~ 0-__ 2:L\r/J~ 11 "' 
(4.Jxl744)· () 
---- ·----~ 
.i \\'or1d rd'cn:ncc pric.: 1~ 1n domcstt~.-' l'lltTl'Jh.:y per ton. aJlcr adjuqmcnt for transportation ..:osts 
I )nmcstJc pnJduct10n JS in l 000 tons 
d l )Jrc,:t Pa~ mcnt;-; arc 111 millions of domestic cun·c:ncy The direct payments may include ddlcicncy or disaster payment<.;, arc;\ and 
hedge paymcnls. di \'t.T\ions. lc\·Jcs f.:-cs. ,md dnuhk har\'cst promotions. ::unong others. 
'-' lndi1 L'l't Pa~ mcnt" arc also m rnillion~ of domestic currency The indirect payn1c-nt.s ma:: include a:.;sistancc through input suhsidic~. and 
~'--·n..:Ltl agricultural sc-n·iccc.; lib: credit and rural ckctrlficatinn. in case ofd~vdoping countries 
!"he formul:t used above has hcen modilied hv multipl\ing and di,·iding 1t hv the domestic production, Q. to facilitate grapl11cal 
,:ompari<.>ons \\ith the graphical analysis of PSE estimates. 
g !"he world rdcrcrKe prices in c·a.se of0Jigeria and India have heen extrapolated from the CSD,\ (1 990) data set. 
Source Own cakulatrons using the data from OECD ( 199 I), Tabics oJProducer ,','ub.1·1dy Eqwmienls and Consumer S11hsJd)' 
L":fu,,·uienl.i, ! 9~')-'JO. OCDF '(j]) (91 )128. Paris: and \\'ebb,..\.. ~I. I .opcz and R. Penn ( 1 990). Eslimates a( Producer and Cons1wu!r 
.<un \l(h i'."mnvalenrs.· (im·ernmenr interventiOn rn .-ignculrure. J 98]-8~. l- S.D A. ERS. Statistical Bulletin ~o Rrn .. -\pril. \\':d1ington, 
IJC 
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Table 6 Extent of distortions captured by NRP and PSJ,__· Small exporting countries 
ii>or/J lJomt~sl!C Uomestlc 
l~eft!rt_:nce ProJ11cer ProciZ1CllOn 
.nr;cc· Pncc" 
-------
:·l!ar (!',) (!',) rQJ 
·1 usrnu rli 'hcc:tJ 
1081J 2~~ I 3362 12()1 
;lJ\)() I' 19 3 3623 1-104 
,·.,t'( ·)cr: r ;nzcut) 
i9SI' RIO 963 11 ')_, 
]')t)(l .j()(/ 136 I 21GS 
,'-'orah "'l/r:ca Ot'heaf)h 
1%2 2XC 281) 242() 
I '1~r, _)(\() ](,() ~=:s~ 
nu'!d 
I 'JX2 26 J ') 20')() 5324X 
----- ·------~----~~---------
D~rt:d .TnJirect 
PuJ·ments~ J)oymenn'' 
( [)) (I) 
-127 2SG 
-241 
II 
-!02 
() 
() 
(I 
.\:[if( 
(Percent) 
Q{1\J- 1'.} P.·Q 
1201 { 3%2-2~1_1_-~ = 23 
(120lx273Ui 
rse 
IPL'n.:cnt) 
2.3 
il201:d3G2!- 127 
1404{3623- L< l 9 ~=us _ld0_:l_;_lGD-l < 19-"~ >-241 · LB = ~9 
(1404x1'19.XJ 1141!-1x3623)-2·ll 
_1193{%3-810} -19 
(1193-.:gi(J) 
_ilQ2iJ]61-4QQl = 2-liJ 
(1265x400) 
2420{286-2801" II 
(2-120:-;28()) 
22_:\_~j}l>0_c3_Gill~ (\ 
(22S'dh0J 
_l_l_2Jt9CJ3-810'- II· -18=21 
(I l'J:h963J+ 11 
2 l G5 1 13hl:-_:HlliJ_:__:lQ_Llf£ ~ 7J 
(12G5xJ3(,J )' 402 
JJ 2 () .: =: s t~ ~ JLti-=-_Q___=__~rJ_/J_ -~ 1 2 
r2-121i~nr;) · 11 
22~~.2_i~_(2:__._~~__:__1)_ ~()5 (; ::::; 
12::::~.:;\J(;I' IJ 
5324X{2090 - 26 12l_= -20 _'i}l::\S '2090 - 2619' · 22.2(,_--; = __ , 
('~2.f8x2GI'J) (5124~-.:2090 
.t W ,xld rdcrcn,·c price is in domestic currencY per ton, after adjustment for transportation costs. 
h Pr<Jduccr pnL·c j-.; in domcsti~ cuncncy per ton 
c Domc~1iL· produ·-~tlon is in 1000 tons 
d Direct Pa:vment~ :tre in millilms of domestic currency ·n1c- direct payment.;; may include deficiency or disaster paym.:nl". area .:1nd 
hedge pa~'!ncnto..;_ di,·ersJons, \evies:fces. and double har\'cst promotions. among others. 
Indirect Paym~_'nls arc abo in millions of domestic currenc~ The indirect payment<.; rna~-: include assistance through input suhsaiics. and 
~?.cncral :1gricultural services like credit .1nd rural ckL·triticatiun. in case of developing countries. 
:·he l(mnula llS·cd ahow ha.s been modified hY multipiYtng and JiYid[ng [t bv the domestic production. Q. to facilitate graphtcal 
· ... ·~1mparisnns with the graphical analysis of PSL' c~timaks. 
L', lhc i'SF est mutes are calculated using the data set and in some cases mav not necessarilv match those provided in CJErn ( 19'J I) 
h lh: \\orld reference pnces in ca.se of:\igcria and India have been e~1rapolated from the USDA (1990) data set. 
Sourc'e Own calculations using the data I rom OFCD ( 1991 )_ Tobie.\ of Producer SullSldy Eqtuvu/ents anJ Consumer SuhstJy 
r·./ii<'-'>Jienl' . .' 'i"~-9(), OCDLGD (9 i )128. Paris~ and Webb. A., :--1. Lopez and R. Penn (1990), b·runU/es of Producer and Consumer 
qcl\ i:.uun·olenrs· Uovernmenr !ntervenuon tn.-1gnculture. 198.'-8~.\.:.S.D .. -\.. ERS. Statistical Bullctm ]\;o_ 803. ApriL Washington. 
Ill 
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Table 7 E::xtent of consumer market distortions captured by NRPC' and ('Sf: Case of small 
importing countries 
~i ·orlJ [)0mest;c [)omestzc 
P.cl~:rcnc Con.l'l'mt-'r ( 'onsu.mption' 
Pr:(J:n 
Y -:.1r l-'rzcc ·= 
il'.) r!J J 
1 (>-!9'1 ()57.1 
i ')~4 21 '2 43719 
[JJ reCl 
(J 
0 
lnchre::t 
(L) 
X-1746 
33()()') 
:VRPr'c 
(Per ,-cnt) 
-[43719 { 1932_:_2J511J~ Ill 
(4:1719x2152) 
T~Rs calculations do not di:-::tinguish hd\vcen direct and indirect paymenls to consumers 
" \\ nrld reference pncc is in domt:stiL· cuJTcnc~ per ton. atkr adjustment for transportation costs 
h Cnn:.;umcr price is in domestic L'un·cncy per tt•n 
])ornc:-;11.: .:tmsumptiunJs in 1000 ton:-. 
C.S~F 
(Percent) 
-[43719! 1932-2))_ll_:_33009[ -II 
(41719\1'!32) 
d ])Jrcct PaYment:-; are in million;-; cd"Lh)mcstJc -.·urTcnc: The <..ilr..._·,:t pa\mcnt." may mcludc f;)nd -.;tamp-; amt)Jl~ nth..._·r" 
..._. Indircd Paymcnh arc al.--.:c' in mil linn;-. nf JonlL·:-:tiL' curr-:-Ih.:: 
!'he fonnul;t fnr YF<TY' has hccn nwdiiicJ h:y mul11rlying and d1\ 1ding h) the domestic consumption k\·d to fa..:ll!tatc compan--.:ons \\Jth 
the r'.)'h' t?<.;timaks 
.''o/IU ~:Own calcu!ati''"' using the Jata from \Vchb_ A, ).!. Lopez and R Penn ( 1990 ), fo's!Jmules o(/'roducer and Cnnsumer Suh1d1 
i-qlll\'dent,• ( jm·ernmenl !nterTennon 1n ,-lgnculture, I 98:!-8-_ l' S J) A., EFS, Statistical Bulletin :\o 803. ,\priL Washingl<'IL D.C 
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Table 8 Extent of distortions captured by NRI' and PS~ Large exporting country 
-------~-- ---~~--~------
!I·~Jr/d !JomeH!C Dnnh'stlc ]Jzrect lndzrecr 
HL~lUrc'nCt! ,0 rl )Juccr rroJu.cl/()T1 ra_ymenrsJ fJO\'!J/Cnt:: 
(P. l (!'.,\ (Q! (DJ (I) 
--- -------·----
'."-.• -1 rilhcuu b 
\Pi{ 
(Percent) 
!'SP 
(Percent ·J 
Q I 1' d · P. l · ]) · I !'., • C)· I J 
I 'JX(J 11-'l 1-'l-'l r,-1 G ~9l) -;'(_;7 
64 G { 144-1-14 '· -~ 11 
(G4.Gcd 44) 
646' l-14-14-:lj_- _5-'J(,_:_](J 7 ~I-I 
(h-1 (,;:J-1-1)' '96 
J<J'J() go r, 9G 74 7 2-101 62(! 
74.7 1.2r)-go~QL =t9 
(747,X06J 
_7-I_Cl._96cR~iil'__2__40]__:~2(~ 4-l 
I')~(! 12~ : 164 50.2 () ~ru_;.J Gt-12:'..::.:..~ Jo 
('0.2..:125./j 
(7-1 7,<)6) 2-Hl\ 
_l_Q__~ U 52_:±- I ::: UL_Q--=_J2] Ii_ 5I 
('IJ 2xl (J-1)· () 
](17_ 1 171 -244 79.1 
_72.S117J-J o-_u_~ 6n 
(72.Sxl07.l) 
72.S 1 17_Ll(J.L1J_,244· 79:1 ~ -1.1 
(72X\I71 )- 24-1 
.1nuclo r.\h/k) 
I ')X(} 161 7 7.95 149 207 ~-I?_~_{2R2~ = 7-t 
(7.95xl6J 7) 
7.:J5 _f 2g2-HJ 1 7 L•-14t) T 207 = ::;~ 
(79"x2X2) · 1--\'J 
l'J'JIJ -1\R 121 S.02'418-15_8,0l~ 116 
(X 02,\.'X X) 
J: 02L4l~-15K&'.LU_-___,<()(>_c SiJ 
0.24 I) 
'-II X 17.-1 1.1 2 0 
'' 1 X 
77.17 
. 0~}0_~2±fL,'_()_} -- -211 
(X IO,!UO) 
_13. 2 1 3 7. ·1:.'2::LLU ~ 31 
(13 2x"-1J X) 
a \\.orld rd~rt?ncc rnc~ is in dom~stic currency per ton. after adju;-;tmcnt for transportatie.1n cosl" 
h Producer price is in domc~tic currency per ton 
l h)IllC<.;tic prnductwn is in million tons. 
!X02\4\XJ 121 
~:}_iL Li~ ::: ~+_-Jl_]_V_l_~~L _(~ l :-: 
iX :1(;,1) 2-l I· (J 
d Dirc...:t Pa\ mcnL\ ar~ in rnillions of dome~tic CLIITency: The direct paymcnl.:;; may include ddicicncy or disa.o;;;ter payments. <1rea and 
hedge p:l\ m-2nts diversions. k\·icsTecs. and douhk har ..:cst prnmotions, among others 
t: Indncct Pavmenh arc al.<-~u in millions ofdome~tic currency The indirect paymcnL<.; llM:"r' include a~sista!lL'C through mput ;-.;uhsJdic~. 
mark ding subsidies and gcneral .:1gricultural services like rcscar...:h aJq;.;pry etc 
The f0nnula fur :\liP ha' been modified bv multiplying and di\iding 1t b\· the domestic producti.:m. Q. to hctlitatc graphical 
l.'t)rnp,lrisons \'>ith the graphical anal:-y·sis of I\'J~!~· cstimaks 
~ !'he ns,r: --~stlmatcs arc calculated using both the data sd and in some ca.scs rna:- nut ne..:essarily match thosl.." pro\·idcd in UEC!) ( 1991 ) 
h i'hc \\ orld reference price for l no was extrapolated from the OECIJ ( 1991) data set. 
The wnrld rcfcrenL·e price fC1r Argentina was extrapolated from the LSD,\ ( 1990) data set. considering trade policv transfers as the wedge 
hct\\L't.'n th ... : domestic and world rcfcrcn~..·c prices . 
. >'nwce. Own calculations using the data from OECD ( 1991 ). Tahles a/Producer Su/os;dy Hqwvalems and ( 'onsumer Suhs;dy 
Lc;zumic'nl.\. ! 0-'/-'JIJ. OCDE. GD (91 )128. Paris: and \\'ebb . .-\.. ~!. Lopez and R. Penn (1990). Estunates o(Producer and ( 'omumer 
.\'uhs:J~· r·.'lfW\'Olcnrs: c;overnment fnrcrvenllon In .~lgnculturf?, 1982-8-:, l:.s.D.:\_, ERS, StatistJcal Bulktin :\o 803. April. \\-'ashington. 
IJC 
II> 
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Table 9. Extent of distortions captured by NRP and PSE Large importing country 
.reur Worid Uomestzc f)omestiC 
!<.e(erpnce Pr(!ducer f;nJd7iCfi(Jn 
i")nce: l)r,'ce 
0'~! (!'<) r!J! 
. --------·---
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Poyrnenr~-~ l)t;_ymenr.~· 
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314 
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(J 
SI'R' 
(Percent) 
_ 5X~(__l_!S-47j_~ :'."9 
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_'l'\ii_]~:!c2::L3l ~ "21 
('J4hx2-+X) 
i Pt::rL't.'llt J 
IJ{Pc~-l'w}·D-1 !'., ·0·/l 
-'~J( 178-4 ~l_:__24(J()_(J_ )2Q(J(J_c '!(, 
(581x 17X) · 241WJ 
99 
('!4(;\1'4)- 12000 
_I 03'QL275-!>l::\l_~ .>~s liLJ~)-61_::!1= 2:14_:]})1 "S7 
(HJ3'0xu1 4) (10 -'''27'1· 214 
_{L~' 156~:3.D_±_§j_~ ~~~ 
(·!I Xx31;-! (,) 
-~;_ll____l2_2()-23,(1 L= :=;.p 
(''l.\236) 
~~J_;_!)..,~-30-Lfll • _ _(_!_:___ T2 =- 92 
(41X'I''•'J· 0 
~_,'-_ll_j}=:C)-; .. ~~ ~-;--X~ 
(~~]\J5::(>} () 
d Dncct Paynwnts are in millil•ns of dnmc~ti.::: currency. The dirc'-·t ra:mcnLs may include dcficu.:nc\· or disaster payments. arL'a and 
hedge paymt:nt:-;, di\·-::r~ions. levies ·tt:c~. and dnuhk harYcst promotiOn.>... among others 
Inclirc-:t Pa~Tncnt-; an: al~o in milhons of' dom~:stic currency The indirect payments may inclulk ass1stancc through input subsidit..:s, 
marketing subsidies and gen~ral agricultural scn·iccs like research advi.c:.ory de 
The l(,nnu/a tl1r .\RP has been modified bv multiplying and dividin~ it hv the domestic production. Q. to !:tci/itatc graphical 
.. :nmpan~ons \\ith the graphical analysis of PSi:· estm1aks. 
,, The/),....,~!:· estimates arc calculated using hoth the data set and in :-:.orne cases may not necessarily match those provided in CJECrJ ( 1 9tJ 1 ) 
.<,-,;,.rll) 0\\ tl .:alculatJons U\ing the data from OFCU ( 1901 ). Tahles c~(J)roa'u.cer Suh ,.1J.1· Eqwvuienrs and Conswnt~r ,)'uh.,ld) 
r:,n,·, m',•nis . .' 'T'I· ')II. OCDL (]/) (91) 12X. Pans~ and \\'ebb. A, C. I. Lope! and R. Penn ( 1 ')90). Lsruna12s o(ProJucer and c 'on.\IU!ler 
S:1l <:i·.· L·~.nun.Iienr~· r -,;~_, .. ern men! fntcrvcnuon 1r1 .{r.;ncu!mrc. / '),..,'~ -8-. l. S.D . .-\., E:\S, Statistical Bulletin ~'o. t:O~. :\priL \\'a:..;hing1t)ll 
])(_ 
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Table 10. Extent of consumer market distortions captured hy NRPC' and CSF 
---------
~'l!ur Wnr/d I )oJnestiC /)oml!st;c Dtre(l indlrecr 
Rt::r~:rence Consumer ( 'onswnruon Pavmenrs·; fJCH'lllr?nf_~.r 
PnLe~ Fncr! 
(!'w) (!\) !Q! (D,) (l,) 
-------------------~ --------
7() 109 29~07 0 0 
() (I 
·J!Wn rJJect and i 'cui) 
2209420 880 0 -838190 
.\P,P(-1 
(Percent) 
::119"07' 1 Q'_l_::IQJJ ~-56 
(29"07x70) 
~4_(J_{Ji'!Jd~.2ll ~ 511' 
('J54(hl4~) 
::LX~O I 2209420-381 son' I 
(880-.:381500) 
• -179 
~-~)t:.._'. 1 ·:;L~.:"·· Fl<S l-alculations do not distingui~h hct\h'cn dir:.._',..~t and indJr;;~,..'t pa:nh.:nt:-; to n)!lsum'-''" 
.1 \\ l)r]d ,-..~f: ... Tcn-.:c prH .. 'e JS in dlmlc~tic cuTTen .... ·~ p...-r hm. atlcr adn~:--tmcnt fl)r tran">pc·I1at!on l"\l."t." 
h C()J1'-;lJll1Lr pr!CC h in dmncstic CUTTc'lll'\ rcr 1l)J1. 
'- Dl)J11C'-'1i..: :..·on~umrtil•n 1c; in l (J()(J tuns 
"'Sf:' 
(P~r-::cnt) 
- 12 9 ~ f!1l_ )(!')_: 7\U_I c 3~> 
rc'!'07,109l 
j_'J_'-lll 'S%-L-liUI ~ -SJ 
r'!'·W\X%) 
::.LJ::B__Q_J._££0_2_420-38 I 500 }-~38190 I 
(XXfJ.-.:220'!420) 
• -S3 
d ])JrCLt Payment:-, arc lll millillll') n!"dnmc:---tic i...'li!Tcnc~ The direct ra~m~nb ma~ include j()l)d stamp ..... ,lJlWllg \)thLJ'-. 
Indirect Pa\·mcnt..; arc abn 111 mil bon\ of domcstJL' ~...·uncnc: 
Th~ t()rmub tl.Jr .\HPC ha:-. been mndi!icd hy diYiding and multipl~ ing it hy the domcst1c cpnsutnption in order to l:ll'llit~ttc graph1cal 
... :nmrari"-nns \\Jth the c·s1~· cst1matc-s 
.\ourcc Own colculations using the da1a !rom Wcbh . .-\.. \!. Lopez ond R. Penn (1990). Lmmates o(/'roduccr and Consumer Suhsidy 
l·qu.To!cnts ( iovernmenr Jntervenrwn In . ./_o:;ncuiture. 1982-8-. FS. D . .-\.. ERS. Statistical Bulictin :\o. RU3. April. Washingtun. ll.C 
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Figure I. Policy-wise pr·oducer protection expenditures captured by 
alternatiye measures of support for l"nited States: Wheat, I 979-94 
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Figure 2. Comparative analysis of policy effects captured by PSE and PSEm 
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Source ll1c !'SF wheat figures arc from OECD ( 1991 ), The Tables of Producer Subs1dy Eqwvalenrs and Conmmer Su bsid!' 
c,!'"·caienls · !9-9-91J. OCDE GD (91) 12R. Pans~ and Webb, A, ~L I .opcz and R. Penn ( 1990). Esillnares a/Producer and 
r 'onsumcr Suhs1dy Equ,va!enrs: Government Jnrervenlwn 1n Agncullure. 198]-8-, USD,\. FRS, Statistic:~! Bulletin :-.:o. grn. 
·\pril Washington D.C. 
Figure 3. Comparison of wheat PSEs of United States as estimated 
by OECD and USDA 
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Figure 4: Measuring distortions in a small countr·y case 
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Figure 5. Measuring distortions in a small developing country case 
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Figure 6. Measuring distortions in a large exporting country case 
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Figure 7. Comparison of measures of protection under price discrimination 
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